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ABSTRACT
Real estate capital markets are generally seen as
lagging securities markets by ten to twenty years in the
application of modern portfolio theory. This applies to
both the efficiency of the market itself, as well as to
the level of sophisticated market analysis. This has
important implications to portfolio managers in the face
of increasing competition for optimal returns. Modern
portfolio theory has provided the methodology for
structuring such optimal portfolios for over three
decades.
This thesis reviews how modern portfolio theory is
itself an evolution of increasingly sophisticated
principles, which by no coincidence are applied to
stock equity and fixed income bond markets first, before
finding application in real estate. The thesis
reviews the literature for examples applying to real
estate. A trend becomes apparent that demonstrates the
increasing level of sophistication that has been
employed for research and implementation in analyzing
real estate equity investments, particularly in the face
of institutional entrants to the market.
A particular segment of the institutional market, the
pension fund industry, was surveyed in 1990 for the
level of sophistication in its real estate portfolio
management. The results serve to test eight hypotheses,
which when aggregated, demonstrate that perceptible
changes have occurred in the sophistication of portfolio
management techniques on the part of the pension
industry.
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THESIS
By most accounts of the academic literature on real
estate investment, this class of asset was considered a
non-traditional investment in the financial world less
than twenty years ago (Melnikoff (34) p.407). In fact,
real estate as an investment wasn't even noticeably
addressed in the literature until 1960, when The
Appraisal Journal published two articles on the
subject. It is difficult to pin-point a single
exogenous event that brought real estate into the realm
as an investment grade asset suitable for portfolio
acquisition. On an individual investment basis,
however, the 1961 revision to the Internal Revenue Code,
Sections 856-8, which created the raison d'etre for the
real estate investment trust (REIT), can be considered
as the major impetus. Similarly, the enactment of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974
provided an indirect push for increasingly wealthy life
insurance companies in their role as fiduciaries for
pension funds and various pension funds to invest in
real estate. ERISA established rules and guidelines for
these sizeable investors to minimize the risk of
catastrophic losses within their portfolios by exhorting
them to prudently diversify their investments. The
1See F.Case, Comparable Real Estate Investment
Experience, The Appraisal Journal 28:337-344,July 1960;
and J.D.Landauer, Real Estate as an Investment, The
Appraisal Journal 38:426-434, October 1960.
literature on real estate up to that time had extolled
the virtues of the cyclical nature of real estate in
terms of its value as an inflation hedge, and its high
residual value from appreciation due to its unique
economic features (Hartzell, Hekman,and Miles
(22) ,p.238).
Although ERISA had the effect of indirectly coaxing
the markets' increasingly wealthier investors and
lenders, such as pension funds, into real estate as an
investment, there were a great many reasons why this did
not occur overnight. From the standpoint of equity
investment, there are five possible explanations:
1) TAX EXEMPTION: Pension funds are tax-exempt if
they operate in accordance with Departments of Labor and
Treasury regulations. The four primary sources of value
to real estate are:
a) Cash Flow Return including the
b) Amortization Return; and
c) Gain from Tax Shelter, and
d) Return from Appreciation
Because many real estate deals concentrated an
inordinate amount of their attention on the sheltering
of ordinary income, real estate looked relatively
overpriced to the tax-exempt pension funds. Since the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) significantly reduced these
tax benefits, a further impetus for pension fund
investing in real estate equity has emerged; as a result
they should now be able to better compete for individual
projects or multi-project portfolios, given the more
level tax-benefit playing field.
2) VARIABILITY/VOLATILITY of RETURNS: As the
primary measure of risk, the perception of volatility in
real estate returns (because of economic cycles) made
the fiduciary role of pension funds less likely to
consider the asset class.
3) LABOR INTENSITY: Pension funds have been
passive investors, who looked at real estate as a labor
intensive, management challenge in deriving returns.
Professional management existed to alleviate this
burden, but their fee structure served to further reduce
the expected real return.
4) LACK OF INFORMATION: In comparison with other
capital markets, investors and lenders have found that
while information sources of investment-required data
may be available on single properties, the data required
for portfolio inclusion, primarily for the purposes of
diversification, is scarce or severely limited.
5) LACK OF SOPHISTICATED ANALYSIS: Pension funds
have grown accustomed to the very sophisticated theories
on investment analysis that have governed investments in
the stock and bond markets (Conroy, Miles and Wurtzebach
{l0},p.607). The combination of these have formed the
basis for what has become known as Modern Portfolio
Theory (MPT) with the following theories and models by
time frame and authors that conceived them:
Portfolio Efficient Frontier 1952 Markowitz
Capital Asset Pricing Model 1964 Sharpe
Arbitrage Pricing Theory 1976 Ross
Options Pricing Model 1973 Black&Scholes
Options Pricing Model 1979 Cox, Ross, &
(expanded to consider Rubenstein
market inefficiencies) 1979 Rendleman &
Barter
Mortgages and construction loans, as direct real
estate investments were likewise viewed askance by the
pension funds, as the cost and administrative burdens of
first originating, and then servicing them made the
vehicles unworthy for the time and effort, when compared
with investing in stocks and bonds (Brueggeman,Fisher
and Stone {8},p.607). (There were several other reasons
for the funds' reluctance to invest in these instruments
as well, and they will be dealt with later.)
Despite the pessimistic rationale for not investing
in real estate, some 39,375 pension funds alone, as of 1
July 1989, reported over $113.5 billion of their $2.2
trillion of assets invested in tax-exempt real estate
assets (Money Market Directory {38) p.xiv; and Pension &
Investment Age {26} p.33). This includes over $90.3
billion in real estate equity (79.6%), $17.9 billion in
hybrid debt assets (15.7%), and $5.3 billion in mortgage
assets (4.7%). A more current gauge comes from Pensions
& Investments (Ring {42} p.1), wherein the total
discretionary tax-exempt assets handled by the universe
of professional money managers is reported at $2.174
trillion as of 1 January 1990. Real estate equity is
reported at 6% or roughly converted, $130 billion,
although equity real estate is quoted further along in
the article as $102.57 billion. Regardless, the
investment in real estate equity over the past ten years
has more than doubled, and shows signs of keeping pace
with its current allocation within the mixed asset
portfoios.
There is a generalized axiom within the real
estate community that in relation to the other capital
markets, real estate is nominally twenty years behind
the other asset markets in terms of sophisticated market
analysis. For example, Blake Eagle of the Frank
Russell Company, when asked about the relevance of
modern portfolio theory to equity real estate investing,
commented that, "We'll end up with a few good
well-accepted principles and methods. We're now where
the stock market was during the 1960's - and that's what
happened there." (Lewis {31),p.160). This perception
may be due to the very unique nature of real estate in
relation to other capital markets. Among the factors
that differentiate real estate in a relative sense are:
a) Indestructibility and Immobility
0 Adaptability of use over time
b) Capital intensity
0 Imperfect divisibility
0 High transactional costs
0 Illiquidity
c) Heterogeneity of the product
0 Locational differences
0 Exclusively privatized transactions
O Property-specific financing
0 Infrequency of trades
d) Local versus a national,or international
orientation
0 Availability of property-specific data
0 Nuances of local governmental controls
0 Regional economic volatility
0 Responsiveness to market forces of supply and deman
e) Informational lag of ex-post data
0 Non-public information of transactions
0 No national market exchange
The real estate industry changes at an ever-increasing
pace. Evidence of this general condition can be seen in
areas of change from entrepreneurialism to
institutionalization; fragmented entities to vertically
integrated corporations; direct investment and total
ownership to securitization; and from local, regional
franchise to globalization. It should be noted that the
real estate industry is not being singled out in this
regard, but is rather the continuation of business
trends begun in the decade of the 80's.
With this growth and refinement occurring in the
real estate market, one would expect a similar
sophistication in the investment analysis of real estate
as a preferred portfolio asset. Interesting insight
into the developments of this aspect of the emerging
industry over the last thirty years has been tracked by
Ricks (1964), Wiley (1976), Farragher (1982), and Page
(1983), which were all consolidated and compared by Webb
{49} using survey data from 1982-83. Webb concluded
that although the largest investors in real estate
(pension fund managers and life insurance companies) had
in fact improved on their quality of investment
criteria, that improvement was only marginal, and in
essence yielded suprising results in many areas as to
the lack of sophistication in techniques for
investment analysis.
This study attempts to determine if the real estate
investment community has made perceptible changes in
portfolio management methods since Webb's 1982 study.
After all, the investment in real estate (mortgages,
mortgage securities, and equity) by the pension funds
has risen from a liberally estimated $40 to $56 billion
in 1982 (Webb (49),p.496) to over $113.5 billion in 1989
(MMD {38},pp.xix,xx). This compares with total pension
fund asset base of $135 billion in 1971 when there was
virtually no investment in real estate equity, and one
year after both Fama's (13) treatise on the efficiency
of capital markets and PRISA began its marketing effort
to pension funds (Melnikoff (34). Today it is estimated
that over $1 billion in U.S. tax-exempt funds are being
committed to real estate investment per month! However,
two ensuing stock market crashes, a bond market
collapse, and a major lending debacle related to real
estate in the savings and loan community have caused
extreme anxiety within the community of portfolio
management in the ensuing years. With the magnitude of
tax-exempt cash being allocated to real estate equity
investments, along with the endogenous volatility of the
real estate market over the last five years in
particular, the author makes the general hypothesis that
the evolution of real estate portfolio management
practices have improved significantly in their level
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of sophistication since Webb's (49) survey in 1982.
There is a renewed awareness and interest in becoming
refamiliarized with portfolio management techniques, as
evidenced by the Pension Real Estate Association (PREA)
conducting its first annual Institute of Portfolio
Management in 1990 at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology {33). The author wishes to acknowledge the
assistance and support of Professor Marc A. Louargand
of MIT, who as the driving force behind the first annual
MIT/PREA Institute, involved me in the early stages of
the conference, so that this study could be conducted to
help serve the educational content of the Institute. To
the extent that this paper can shed further insight on
where a significant portion of today's money managers
stand in their sophistication of real estate analysis,
it will have met its goal.
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CHAPTER 1
REAL ESTATE: THE ASSET
Within the universe of assets the one inextricable
link among them is their individual ability to possess
value from which exchanges of other goods and services
can be made. As such an asset, real estate derives its
value from the rights, interests, and benefits in the
ownership of the physical form of real property. The
economic precepts of real estate (relative scarcity,
longevity, locational importance, and adaptability of
use) allow it to be considered a suitable investment
vehicle on its own merits, as well as a significant
component of portfolio wealth.
To be sure, investment in real estate has its
disadvantages too. For one, it is relatively an
illiquid investment in its pure equity form, and this
difficulty of converting the investment to cash requires
high transactional costs in terms of time and money.
Secondly, its fortunes are inextricably linked to
economic cycles, although the real estate cycles may or
may not be phased with the underlying economic cycle.
As such, it is by nature a longer term investment,
nonetheless dependent on short and long term
fluctuations. Lastly, it is a manually intensive and
complex investment with a distinctively local/regional
flavor from a managerial, as well as a transactional
standpoint. These unique features of the real estate
asset create both opportunities and risks which must be
thoroughly comprehended and analyzed by any serious
investor.
The difference between investment analysis and
portfolio analysis may seem to be an insignificant
flirtation with semantics. However, the differences are
significant in the very foundation of this thesis.
Investment analysis exists to predict the future
prospects of returns for specific types of assets, while
portfolio analysis concerns the prediction of the amount
and variability of returns from a group of diverse
assets. These returns, represented in the forms of
periodic receipts, tax-sheltered income, amortization of
principal, and terminal residual value, enable an
exchange value to be placed on real estate. These same
returns when coupled with an assessment of their
variability allows the value of real estate to be
compared with that of other assets. In this latter
context a portfolio of assets can be produced to satisfy
any financial objective. Just how this is done requires
the use of extensive mathematics under significant,
qualified assumptions.
Real estate investment analysis is predicated on a
simple objective: to maximize wealth through the highest
returns relative to their attendant risks (Jaffe and
Sirmans {28},p.382-3). The returns and risks vary
separately and jointly over the life cycle: from
acquisition to development and through a managerial
holding period, and on along to redevelopment and/or
disposition. While there exist a multitude of
decision-making approaches to real estate investment,
today all are focused either on the return or the risk
component, or both. The track record of real estate
investment throughout the 1970's indicates a heavy
reliance on the return component for investment analysis
and decision-making (Jaffe and Sirmans {28},p.381).
Risk was largely subjective, and those successful in the
business were given credit for their gut-instincts:
skills acquired through extensive familiarity of the
local markets. Despite the existence of quantitative
models, this attitude still remains quite prevalent
today (Jaffe and Sirmans {28), p.392; and Ross,
Firstenburg and Zisler {45),p.1). Regardless of the
approach, one factor in the analysis remains key, and
that is in comparing the investment to something else,
i.e. the opportunity cost of not investing in something
else.
In order to accommodate the tenure and variability of
the multiple aspects of returns, and benefits
(depreciation, tax-loss carry-forwards) derived from
real estate investment, a framework for the measurement
of investment performance had to be developed in order
to facilitate the comparison of investment alternatives.
The quantitative technique that allows for this
standardization has become known as the discounted cash
flow (DCF) method. It has become prevalent in every
finance text since the 1970's, although in one case,
Brueggeman et al.{8), the term itself is never
mentioned. The technique focuses on the valuation of
cash flows expected over the holding period of the
investment. As is highlighted below, the cash flow
returns are themselves subject to a probability
distribution, which is most often deterministic, i.e. a
specific value for each cash flow variable that is
inputed. The cash flows are partitioned into the
following categories for real estate:
Cash Flow (CF) from:
Operations ~ All in terms
Tax Savings (Payments) | of Monthly,
Refinancing | Quarterly, or
Disposition net of reversion__I Annual Terms
These cash flows when discounted by a utility rate of
return, i.e. hurdle rate, internal rate of return (IRR),
financial rate of return (FMRR), etc., yields a value, a
present value (PV) or net present value (NPV), that an
investor would be willing to pay for the net
income-producing capacity of the asset. Alternatively,
DCF can used by a lender (construction loan, mortgage)
to determine a proper yield for the use of their
capital. The general mathematical form of the
discounted cash flow looks as follows:
PV = CF + CF2 +... + CF 
_ + CFn + TPn1-- 2-n------
(1+r)1 (1+r)2 (1+r)n-1 (1+r)n (1+r)n
And PVrei =PVe + PVm
Where PVrei = present value of the real estate
investment
PVe = present value of the equity
returns
PVm = present value of mortgage
CF = periodic equity cash flow to
an investor over a holding
period from 1 to n.
TP = net reversionary cash flow
(terminal price minus
amortization of mortgage).
r = specific rate of return
measure
The DCF method has been commonly utilized for
comparative rankings of investment opportunities across
a spectrum of investment vehicles. However, a complete
picture of an investment's potential, as previously
discussed, can not be complete without an appreciation
for the variety and multitude of risks involved. In
real estate the generic term, risk, is used to cover all
those factors which may influence the expected return in
a negative or positive way. Another way of saying the
same thing is that risk encompasses all those factors
that will produce a return other than the one expected.
In this sense risk is pervasive throughout every stage
of real estate's life cycle, as well as every accounting
category that is required to derive a periodic cash
flow.
The task of explicitly quantifying the plethora of
risks in any individual real estate project, to say
nothing of a portfolio of real estate investments, at
first appears intimidating. Several simplified methods
have been utilized, nonetheless, to aid in quantifying
risk in order to facilitate decision making (Pyhrr et
al.(40}). Some of the more common risk assessment
techniques are:
Payback Period: How long will it take to recover the
initial cash investment under
deterministic cash flow conditions?
Risk-Adjusted Discount Rate: Adjusting upwards the
required rate of return from the
investment.
Risk-Adjusted Forecasts: Adjusting -downward the benefits
(CF) expected from the investment.
Sensitivity Analysis: Assigning different input
variables to represent deterministic
assessments of risk, in order to
gauge the impact of any combination
to the ultimate measure of
performance.
Probability Distributions: Probablistic assignments to
each uncertain variable in
combination with them all to
simulate the probable outcome for
all variables, individually and
aggregately, on the ultimate
performance measure.
Utility Assignment: The investor specifies preferences
of risk and return in the form of a
preference matrix. Input variables
are weighted as high, probable, and
low, and the performance measure for
each is computed.
While these methods help serve to explicitly identify
various risks, their treatment is mostly subjective and
unsophisticated (i.e. scientifically unsupportable).
Nonetheless, all are still being utilized today in real
estate, as well as other investments. Pyhrr et al.{40)
appropriately relates much of what the rest of the
industry instinctively feels in their commentary:
Real estate decision makers have always
claimed to take calculated risks, but few have
made it clear just how they calculate those
risks. Without the knowledge of how to deal
explicitly with risk in decision making,
people typically concentrate on a few key
assumptions about the future, examine a few
rules of thumb, mull over the situation, and
then make a decision. Although some of the
risk considerations may be explicit, the
mathematics of risk are often left largely to
the four horsemen of the implicit
decision-making apparatus:
judgement, hunch, instinct, and intuition.
Pyhrr, Cooper, Wofford, Kapplin, and Lapides (40) p.75.
CHAPTER 2
MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY
It is the interdependency of expected return and
composite risk that modern portfolio theory (MPT)
provides a paradigm for analysis: not only for the
analysis of a particular property for evaluation of its
investment potential against other opportunities, but
also for the analysis of a particular property, as it
complements other investments (either of like or
dissimilar type) by marginally increasing the overall
portfolio return and/or reducing the overall variability
of that portfolio return. It represents a conceptual
framework based on that found in other endeavors, where
the scientific method of observable measurement of data
has been beneficial in explaining and predicting
behavior.
MPT was not invented necessarily by one person at
one particular place in time. Rather it has come to
symbolize a body of research that has developed over
time as an evolution of previous quantitative work. As
its basis, MPT relies on the quantitative techniques of
capital budgeting, but structured not solely from a
reliance on the "return" component of capital
investments, but also to one that considers and includes
the measurability of the total "risk" component. This
interdependency between the two components can then be
compared to other assets of similar type in order to
derive a quantitative rationale for the investment
decision. MPT then goes a step further by analyzing the
inter-relationships between assets of more than one
class, such as stock-equities, fixed-income bonds, real
estate, precious metals, classic art works, etc. It is
capable of ultimately providing an answer to the
question of optimal allocation of capital across all
asset classes.
The earliest credit for the auspicious beginnings
of MPT is given to Markowitz, who as a doctoral graduate
student, researched the application of probability
theory to see how equity securities moved in price and
time to one another. In this way he began to develop
the idea that an asset's value was indeed the product of
return and risk, that both could be quantified, and that
an efficient set of assets could be developed into a
2
portfolio2. He thereby altered the consideration for an
investment as is graphically displayed on the next page
in Figure 1.
Up to this time, in order for an investor to
realize his objective to maximize his wealth, it was
considered nothing short of prudence not to put all
one's eggs in a single basket. There were plenty of
investment opportunities out there in the capital
markets, one just needed to select the opportunity that
2 As a result of his doctoral research, he first
published his idea in "Portfolio Selection," The Journal
of Finance,7, March 1952, pp.77-91. The theory was
further developed and produce in his book: (Harry M.
Markowitz) Portfolio Selection:Efficient Diversification
of Investment, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959).
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gave the highest return for a reasonable risk. A
portfolio could be diversified by educated decisions
among various asset types and industries/services
wherein the asset was utilized. Markowitz challenged
this approach, which has become known as naive
diversification of a portfolio, and embarked on a theory
to quantify both the reward and risk. In order to
construct a model for this theory, Markowitz set down
the following assumptions.3
1. An investor's objective is to maximize the
utility of terminal wealth.
2. To do this investors make choices on the basis
of return and risk. Returns are measured by
the expected return or mean of the expected
returns, and risk is measured by the variance
of those expected returns. Implicitly, to
attain a greater expected return, an investor
must accept a greater degree of risk.
3. A rational investor in the quest of the
objective will have a goal to diversify away
the risk to the most optimal extent possible.
4. All investors have homogeneous expectations of
returns and risks.
5. Investors have identical time horizons in
which terminal wealth will be realized.
6. Information is freely and simultaneously
available to all investors.
3 The simplifications for these have been derived from
Harrington (20) pp.27-35.
Markowitz' argument acquiesced that there was nothing in
the model that could increase the expected return or
reduce the inherent risk of any single investment.
However, the combination of carefully selected
investment assets could be derived such that the overall
portfolio return could be higher, and the attendant
portfolio risk eliminated, to the extent possible, i.e.
the greatest return for the given risk, or conversely,
the least risk for a given return. Such a model could
then evaluate the benefit (or cost) of an additional
investment asset to the overall portfolio.
The mathematical constructs for the development of
the model were divided into two predominant aspects of
investment selection: expected return and risk
variability of those expected returns. The expected
return of the portfolio was the weighted average of all
possible returns, and as such is a linear function.
E(R )=
n
37 w * R where,
P-'=1 E(R ) is the expected
portfolio return,j is an asset,
w. is the proportion
3 of asset j in the
portfolio,
R. is the return of
asset j
The individual asset's risk has previously been
mentioned as being the probability that the investor
will not receive the expected rate of return, i.e. the
variance or its more widely used root, the standard
deviation. These can be expressed in mathematical and
graphical terms, as follows:
2 ~n2
Variance = 2 - E(R)) P p
where P is the probability of return, R .
Standard deviation = (y 2 2
High| A and B are two
-different investment
assets
Probability
of I
Occurrence -
Low|----------------------------------
Return ->
However, in the context of a portfolio, the
portfolio risk is generally argued to be the variance,
or standard deviation of the return relative to the
expected return. Since an asset must be considered for
its benefit to the other assets in the overall
portfolio, covariance must account for *the
inter-relationship as well. The general form for this
portfolio risk is:
n 2n n
(7p (wi 2 *02) + 2 (wi* *p )( (7'i ()1i~ jzi l=1 p r o h r1 o+1
w= proportion of the portfolio allocated to asset i,
w. =_proportion of the portfolio allocated to asset j,
= correlation coefficient between assets i and j,
Sor . = standard deviation of asset i or j to the
1 expected return, where N
i2j =1Z (Ri - E(Ri))
N
(Pu *(Yi * 4Y*) = covariance between any two assets
The true genius of Markowitz' development was the
application of the covariance of the assets within the
portfolio. A fundamental aspect of portfolio theory is
the idea that the riskiness inherent in any single asset
held in a portfolio is different from the riskiness of
that asset held in isolation (Weston and Brigham (52)
p.355). By using the covariance two or more assets
could be tracked together in an absolute sense, as they
varied over time. Using the same notation that has been
developed thus far, covariance in a mathematical sense
is expressed as:
N
Cov. = 2 [Ri - (Ri)] * [Rj - (Rj)]
i=1=1 ---------------------------
N
where (Ri or j) is the mean
Theoretically, the covariance can range from positive
infinity to negative infinity. By convention two assets
with a positive covariance are said to have their
returns "move together". Conversely, two assets whose
returns are countercyclical have a negative covariance.
The difficulty in using such an absolute measure is that
an investor has difficulty gauging just how beneficial
is the magnitude of the covariance, either negatively or
positively. Thus, the need for a relative measure of
covariance was useful to facilitate the interpretation
of the movement in the returns of the two or more
assets. This relative measure is the coefficient of
correlationf , and as is defined in the equation of
portfolio risk above, it is equal to the covariance
divided by the product of the two assets' standard
deviations.
Cov / C7i * CT
The coefficient of correlation only ranges from +1 to
-1, since two assets in combination can not move more
than the identity of that combination. Perhaps a more
intuitive understanding of this coefficient can be
explained by its association with another widely known
statistical measure, the correlation of determination.
The correlation coefficient,fD,itself is the square
root of the statistical coefficient of determination,
2 2
r2. This measure, r2, may be interpreted as the
proportion of variation in the dependent variable, E(R),
that has been accounted for by the relationship between
R. .j and C. ., expressed in a regression line.Ri or and orj3
Mathematically, another way of notating this:
r2 = explained variation = 1 - unexplained variation
- ------------------ ---------------------
total variation total variation
Since r2 can equal from 0 to 1, r or can range from -1
to +1. 1
When p is positive, therefore, the covariance
will be positive, and the overall second term in the 0Y,
equation will be positive. This is another way of
saying that the overall variance of the portfolio will
increase when the correlation coefficient of the assets
are positively correlated. Similarly, the overall
portfolio variance, i.e. risk, will be reduced when
assets are negatively correlated. With this construct
Markowitz provided the theoretical framework under which
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portfolios could be developed among different assets to
at best eliminate risk (variation) and at the least,
minimize it. An optimal portfolio could then be
developed using an investor's utility information in the
form of isoquants, to locate the point of tangency along
the efficient frontier and the highest isoquant. Since
the major premise of utility theory is the notion of
diminishing marginal utility, these isoquants are also
curved, as well as that of the efficient frontier. This
facilitates the location of an optimal portfolio, by
creating a more distinctive tangency of the two curves.
An important point to note is that with N assets,
there are N variance terms, yet (N2 - N) covariance
terms. As an example, if a portfolio contained 30
investment assets, then one would have to compute 30
variance terms, but 870 covariance terms in order to
calculate the portfolio risk. This excruciating process
of determining these statistical measures was enough to
ensure that Markowitz techniques would not find ready
acceptance in the pre- personal computer days of the
1950's and 60's. Other reasons existed as well. The
Wall Street capital market workers, the researchers, the
analysts, and the asset managers were all rankled by the
assumptions of Markowitz' theory. For if the
assumptions were true, then of what value did their
services add to the process (Harrington (20) p.25)? If
the complexity of investment information was available
to everyone, and understood by everyone who had access
to it, then the entire brokerage community would be
relegated to simply order-taking. The mistrust of the
underlying assumptions of MPT, along with the complexity
of calculations required to ensure a technically
efficient portfolio made the theory unacceptable to the
majority of the financial community in general.
However embattled the Markowitz portfolio theory
may have found itself on Wall Street, it offered academe
a framework which could be expanded through research.
This occurred throughout the 1960's and eventually a
modification to the basic model emerged that could help
simplify the tedium of calculation, as well as help to
explain the dimensions of risk. In 1970, Professor
William F. Sharpe of Stanford University published the
culmination of his work since the early 1960's on the
subject , entitled Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1970), wherein he developed a
capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The CAPM built
directly upon Markowitz' work and utilized a
mathematical mechanism, linear regression, that would
ultimately allow an asset's performance in terms of
return and risk to be compared to the performance of the
overall market of assets, without the tedium of
thousands of combinations of correlation coefficients.
As the name, CAPM, implies, Sharpe sought to
See William F. Sharpe, "A Simplified Model of
Portfolio Analysis," Management Science, 9(January
1963), pp.227-293; and "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory
of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk," The
Journal of Finance, (September 1964), pp.425-442.
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quantifiably explain the price of an asset within the
context of an overall market equilibrium. The market
could be composed of all assets in the securities market
for instance, or the combination of asset classes to
form an imaginary universal market. The fundamental
concepts were the same, but inherently the model was
couched in terms of a single investment entity (asset or
portfolio of them) against a broad market which included
the investment entity. He proposed that there was a
further division of risk because of the asset's role in
the broader market that hadn't been addressed before.
The specific risk of an asset had been dealt with under
the Markowitz model. However, Sharpe reasoned that
there was in addition a market related, or system-level
risk that existed when assets were combined. Markowitz
had demonstrated how the specific risk of an individual
asset could be minimized for a given rate of return by
combining the asset with another whose variance was
lower. In so doing an optimal return could be attained
with a correspondingly lower variance and the portfolio
wind up on the efficient frontier. Yet it was Sharpe's
treatment of the market or systematic risk that brought
into context the possibility of a risk free asset with
some nominal return. If such an asset could exist, then
it meant that the shape of the efficient frontier could
be significantly different than what Markowitz had
shown. Furthermore, somewhere on the efficient frontier
there had to exist a point, representing the overall
optimal mix of return and risk, when all of the market
assets were taken together. At such a point, no further
optimization of return and risk within the market was
possible, unless an investor could borrow at the risk
free rate to buy more of the market's optimal portfolio.
This relationship is expressed in the accompanying
Figure 2 on the following page.
Referring to Figure 2, Rf indicates the risk free
asset, i.e. an asset that has no risk associated with a
nominal return over a finite period of time. This
became the foremost assumption in Sharpe's CAPM in
addition to those of Markowitz' portfolio theory.
Sharpe's additional assumptions are summarized below in
sequence with Markowitz' from which they follow.
7. There is a risk free asset and investors can
borrow and lend unlimited amounts at this
rate.
8. Market imperfections do not exist. There are
no taxes, transaction costs, or restrictions
on short sales. Investors act to keep the
market in equilibrium.
9. Total asset quantity is fixed, and all assets
are marketable and divisible.
The recognition of the possibility of a risk free
asset had major implications to the Markowitz efficient
frontier. By combining this risk free asset with assets
further out on the efficient frontier, say at M, the
overall efficient frontier between Rf and M would be
elevated from its position from A to M. The incremental
increase, when integrated from 0 to M, provides a new
efficient frontier for portfolios that is referred to as
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the capital market line (CML).
Another important advancement that was made under
Sharpe's model was the idea that an index could be
devised out of all possible assets which had some risk
involved with their expected returns. This is called
the market portfolio and as such it represents the full
complement of collective, investment assets whose
overall return and risk place it on the efficient
frontier. No other combination of assets can provide
for a better return/risk efficiency, because no other
asset exists from which to derive benefits. The only
way to obtain more return for incrementally more risk
that is beyond the efficient frontier (from point M to
point 0) is to leverage the portfolio by borrowing at
Rf.
The development of the market index or market
portfolio was significant from several standpoints.
First was that risk could now be defined as the
covariability of an asset's returns in relation to the
market's returns. Secondly, this first significant
attribute allowed for more facility in calculating the
myriad number of covariances that were so restricted
under the Markowitz theory. Since investors require
additional compensation for taking on investments of
higher risks, they won't require any additional
compensation (reward) for risk that can be eliminated,
such as diversification can accomplish by having
portfolios positioned along the CML. In this sense
investors will only be compensated for the systematic
risk of the overall market, not by the full risk of the
asset. This provides incentives for the portfolio
manager to be as efficiently diversified as the market,
M, will provide. This compensation that an investor can
hope to receive for this efficient diversification is
termed the risk premium. From Figure 2 it is
graphically denoted as RP, or the difference between Rp
(expected portfolio return) and Rf (risk free return).
Lastly, the development of the CAPM allowed for the
mathematical explanation of the portfolio return and
risk through comprehendible, graphical terms.
The expected returns from any efficient portfolio,
i.e. one that lies along the CML, could be represented
by:
E(Rj) = E(Rf) + [E(Rm) - E(Rf)] *a"'
Q'm
where (' is the volatility of an asset in the portfolio
J
to that of the overall market. This formula indicates
the linear relationship under the assumptions of
Markowitz and Sharpe between the expected return of the
portfolio and the risk free rate, as well as the market
rate of return. Individual assets behave linearly with
respect to their individual riskiness to the overall
market riskiness and to the overall market return
according to this general formula.
E(R ) = oC+ 3 i(Rm) + E
where: Bc is the unique rate of return of asset j,
/i is asset j's riskiness to the overall
movement within the market, and
is the specific error term associated
with asset j.
This /3 , or beta coefficient, is defined as a
normalized covariance in the following regard:
manner:
Pnj = covariance (R, 9 )
variance (Rm)
Sharpe defined the m, or overall market beta as 1.0,
or an identity. Thus, if/3j = 1, then the asset or
specific portfolio of assets moves in complete
synchronization with the overall market. A beta less
than one,/3 < 1, would mean that the asset or portfolio
moved less volatile with the underlying market.
Conversely, a beta greater than one, / >1, would
indicate an asset or specific portfolio of assets with
greater systematic risk than the underlying market.
CAPM has become one of the most widely used
frameworks for asset investment and allocation
throughout the 1970's and 80's. This is not to say that
it has been the most relied upon decision making tool
across the investment spectrum, however. This is due in
part to a plethora of academically sound criticisms of
its basic assumptions (Harrington (20) pp.24-47). It
was for the latter reason, however, that academe pursued
other theories in order to relieve the reliance on so
many assumptions. One of these that has gained
considerable prominence in the literature is the
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT).
Ross first introduced the concept of
APT in 1976.5 In the 1980's the theory gained in stature
as Ross teamed with Richard Roll in supplying empirical
evidence that strengthened the theory.6 Whereas the CAPM
is an equilibrium theory of asset pricing based on one
"factor", that being "the market", APT recognizes that
the pricing issue is multi-dimensional and seeks
explanation of pricing behavior from a number of
factors. In essence there is no limit to the quantity
of the factors that might be considered, for which the
following generalized equation pertains.
E (Rj) = Rf +P/j1 [E(R 1 ) - Rf] + ... +Pjz [E(Rz) - Rf]
where: E( )= an expected variablej = an asset
z = a factor
R. = return on an asset j
R3 = risk free rate of return
Rz = return on a portfolio with an average
z sensitivity to a factor z, that
systematically affects all returns3 = sensitivity to a particular asset j to a
particular factor z
In comparison to the nine assumptions under CAPM,
the APT borrows four (numbers 1,2,7, and 9) from
Markowitz' theory and CAPM, and sets down two of its own
(Harrington {20} p.193).
See Stephen A. Ross, "The Arbitrage Pricing Theory of
Capital Asset Pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, 13
(December 1976), pp.341-360.
6 Their two works that have been most influential are
"An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing
Theory," Journal of Finance, 35 (December 1980),
pp.1073-1104; and "The Arbitrage Pricing Theory Approach
to Strategic Portfolio Planning," Financial Analysts
Journal, 40 (May - June 1984), pp.14-26.
Stephen A.
10. The number and identity of factors that are
significant to the systematic pricing are
shared by all investors, and
11. There are no riskless arbitrage opportunities.
The theory has been tested solely on stock-equities
market data, and has produced anywhere from four to nine
factors of systematic risk. The four most significant
ones, as deduced by Ross and Roll in their 1983 study
dealt with:
a) Inflation
b) Industrial production
c) Risk premiums of bonds
d) Term structure of interest rates.
While the exact factors are not so significant to this
thesis, it does bring to the forefront the perception
that previous theories may have been lacking in their
ability to provide for making ex-ante decisions based on
anything other than a single, ex-post factor, such as
the trend of the S & P 500 index. The significance of
APT to this thesis, however, is the recognition that
ex-post data is only useful to ex-ante decisions when
the underlying factors that produce that data are fully
understood. Otherwise, decisions made on investments
under an economic scenario yesterday, have no validity
for similar decisions under a different scenario
tomorrow.
The one last model of asset pricing that has
entered the fold (keeping modern portfolio theory
"modern" through the evolutionary process) is options
pricing. As an option is the right of an asset's owner
36
to buy or sell that asset over any future time period,
the underlying principle behind the theory is that such
a right can be monetized. In so doing, an asset's
efficiency in producing income is increased, as some
marginal liquidity is squeezed from the asset at a point
in time where its price volatility is pegged. The
overall effect is to dampen the trading volatility of
the asset's price (which would consume large amounts of
capital if bought or sold outright) in favor of
stripping the right of future ownership or sale and
trading it (which consumes but a small portion of
capital that underpins the value). Developed by Black
and Scholes {6} in their seminal article in 1972, the
model once again sought application to the more
efficient markets of Wall Street. As a result, an
entire futures market has continued to develop
particularly in the United States to take advantage of
market inefficiencies in expectations. The five
underlying components to the asset's value are:
1. The current market price of the asset,
2. The length of the option's temporal
duration,
3. The exercise price at the end of option
period,
4. The risk free interest rate, and
5. The variance of the asset's price over
the option period.
In theory once the asset's price can be determined along
with its volatility, then the option pricing model can
aid in achieving better positioning along the efficient
frontier.
All of the asset pricing models serve to fulfill
this last goal in search of the objective for maximizing
terminal wealth. In a sense they all come back to roost
on Markowitz' original work with its core assessment of
integrated risk and reward, and the optimization of that
assessment through the mechanism of portfolio diversity.
To the extent that various asset classes, or assets of
the same class, can be combined to yield this type of
benefit, modern portfolio theory offers a methodology
for determining how to do so. However, in order to
reach the ultimate level of an optimally allocated
portfolio, the issues regarding the what, where, and
when dimensions must be comparatively understood within
each asset class as well as between the classes.
CHAPTER 3
MPT APPLICATION TO REAL ESTATE
Investment literature is replete with criticism of
the pricing models and portfolio theories, in large part
because of their underlying assumptions. While it is
not of concern to this thesis why the bond and
stock-equity markets find disagreement with MPT, it is
cogent to understand the differences within the asset
class of real estate. To this end, a comparison with
the other two capital markets is unavoidable.
Certainly real estate is not a normal capital
market, partly because investment literature assumes the
stock-equities market is the normative market. Today,
real estate is arguably the third most important asset
class for institutional investors because of traditional
asset allocation (MMD (38) p.xx). However, there is
evidence in terms of real estate's overall contribution
to the nation's wealth portfolio, that would indicate
that under MPT, real estate investments should occupy at
least a plurality of an efficient portfolio (Ibbotson
and Siegel (27) p.224; Miles (36) p.71; Ross and Zisler
(44) p.2; Webb and Ruebens (50) p.466). Therefore,
there has been a tremendous effort by the real estate
community (academe and practitioners) over the last 20
years to explain real estate, as an investment, in the
terms understood by the major money managers, whose job
it is to determine the appropriate allocations to
various investment classes within a mixed-asset
portfolio. Such understanding only comes about through
the facility in which different assets can be more
readily compared. From Friedman's (15) first suggestion
for the use of MPT in real estate investing to the
composite study of Zerbst and Cambon (54) on real
estate's comparable returns and associated risk measures
with stocks and bonds over several time periods, the
real estate community has sought to compare assets'
performances under the same assumptions with the
knowledge that the underlying assets had stark
differences. The closer an asset's qualities were in
matching up to the assumptions of the model, then the
greater the bias was for explaining the results.
Another way of saying this is that the better real
estate's performance was in comparison to the equities
and bond markets, the less credible were the models of
MPT to account for the inherent differences between real
estate and the comparative assets.
Perhaps the single biggest shortcoming of real
estate in comparison to bonds and stocks is the idea of
market efficiency. The underlying assumptions of the
equilibrium theories of Markowitz, Sharpe, and Ross were
enumerated in the previous chapter, and all are in
relative agreement with the conditions that Fama {13}
aggregated in "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, May
1970.
The case against real estate market efficiency
begins with the issue that real estate markets are
regionalized at best, and at the very least highly
localized. The implication is that various economic
factors within these regional markets lead to
increased informational costs, that perhaps inhibit
certain investors from participating fully in the
market. This is in contrast to the national market for
stock-equities and bonds which allows for the
consolidation of faster and diverse transactional
information. Such readily available and current
information provides all investors access to the
markets from any geographic location.
Real estate transactions, however, are much less
frequent and much more complex than most of those found
in other capital markets. This latter difference points
up another significant variation, e.g. the heterogeneity
of the product. Despite the heterogeneity of the firms
underlying the stocks and bonds traded in the capital
markets, the investment product is nonetheless
homogenized. The real estate equity product on the
other hand is a deal-based transaction that is not a
structured, "clean" transaction. Such transactions are
discrete selections on the basis of ones and twos, not
thousands and millions. This brings in the issue of the
divisibility of the asset, which for real estate has
much less to offer, other than hybrid forms of equity
investments (e.g. REITs, Real Estate Limited
Partnerships,(RELPS), etc.). At stake in terms of
market efficiency is the constraint on capital flows
that could result indirectly from this relative
indivisibility. For institutional grade properties such
indivisibility of interests could translate to sizeable,
nominal amounts of capital being required for market
participation. As Gau {16) has noted, such market
segmentation could very well lead to less market
competition and greater market inefficiency.
The divisibility issue concerning real estate
investment influences the holding period investment
decision as well, which for real estate is recognized to
be a long-term investment from the initial commitment of
monies. Not all investors share identical time
horizons, however. Some may hold that horizon to be
finite until the end of the construction and lease-up
period, others until the second, sustaining year of
positive cash flow, and still others 10, 20, or 40
years. With such variable expectations of holding
periods, the same real estate assets are thus priced
differently. This could lead to a further market
segmentation with similar results to those argued
previosly.
Perhaps most significant in terms of the CAPM, is
the issue that real estate has no nationally accessible,
composite index. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, the
provision of the CAPM that allowed for the systematic
risk component of an asset (the risk premium or market
price of risk, to be computed in the first place) was
that an overall market basket of return and risk could
be computed. Referring to Figure 2, this indicates that
Rm can be found along the capital market line at a Beta
equal to 1.0, since the relative risk of the market is:
Covariance Rm) = Variance ) = 1.0
Variance (Rm) Variance ( )
The use of such a market index allowed practitioners of
MPT to significantly reduce the computational load in
conducting an investment analysis on a particular asset
in order to assess its marginal contribution to the
overall portfolio. Only in this way can the efficiency
of the portfolio be optimized. However, the CAPM itself
came under fire through a number of scholarly works,
particularly over the issue of this idea of an index.
Harrington ({20), p.75) for example, cites the work of
Roll 7 and contends that since a true market index
contains all assets, the ability to collect such data is
impossible. In addition, testing such historical data
in an expectational model will yield only disappointing
results. Thus, in a mixed-asset portfolio the capital
market line may be more shallow, the intercept for the
risk free return higher, and the efficient frontier
possibly non-linear. Therefore, can a specific asset
class, particularly one such as real estate equity where
the market inefficiencies are at least taken at face
Richard Roll,"A Critique of the Asset Pricing Theory's
Tests, Part 1: On Past and Potential Testability of the
Theory,"Journal of Financial Economics, March 1977.
value, ever hope to be explained by MPT? The answer lies
in the ability of the theory to provide insights that
aid the portfolio manager in the decision-making process
and the flexibility of the theory to allow for
adaptation.
The research into real estate portfolio management
ironically has not been focused on the real
portfolio, but rather on real estate as an integral
component of a mixed-asset portfolio. Throughout the
1970s and 80s the emphasis has not been on the
development of MPT application to the real estate
portfolio, but rather on the appropriateness of real
estate into an historically, MPT-generated, mixed-asset
portfolio that has been governed by stock-equities
primarily, and fixed-income securities or bonds,
secondarily. Manifestation of this can be seen in the
evolution of market indices to which portfolio
performance is compared. Stock equity indices, such as
the S & P 500, have spawned not only similar indices
for real estate, such as the FRC/NCREIF and Liquidity
Fund, but the mixed asset Ballard, Biehl & Kaisor (BB &
K) index as well. This latter fund, consisting of about
30% each of U.S. stocks, bonds, and real estate, as
well as 10% of foreign equities, attempts to define a
weighted market basket of institutional grade assets.
Strategically, portfolio analysis should begin at the
mixed asset level and work lower into the separaate
asset classes. The benefits of MPT consciousness have
estate
come to real estate through association and accomodation
within the mixed asset portfolio.
The results of this research, summarized below,
present an historical rationale as to why real estate
equity should have been included into the theoretical
mixed-asset portfolio of the past. Real estate equity
investment has:
0 Offered higher returns and lower, composite risk
than stock equities and bonds. (Brueggeman, Chen
and Thibodeau (7); Ibbotson and Siegel (27); Zerbst
and Cambon (54)).
0 Offered diversification through negative
correlations with stock equities and bonds.
(Brueggeman, Chen and Thibodeau (7); Hartzell,
Hekman and Miles {22); Miles and McCue (37); Ross
and Zisler (44); Webb and Ruebens (50) and (51)).
0 Offered a significant inflation hedge, well in
excess of stock equities and bonds. (Brueggeman,
Chen and Thibodeau (7); Hartzell, Hekman and Miles
(23); Rubens, Bond and Webb (50)).
0 Been understated in its risk component
(variability of returns) in relation to stock
equities and bonds due to the differences in
valuation methods (i.e. appraisal functions versus
auction market prices). (Friedman (15); Gilberto
(17); Hartzell (21); Webb and Ruebens (50)).
Largely because these studies were done to convince
mixed-asset portfolio managers of the benefit of
significant allocation to real estate investment,
concurrent studies were undertaken to assess the
benefits of different subclasses of real estate under
the concept of an efficient frontier for real estate
portfolios. The limitations of the nature of real
estate for consideration of a direct application of MPT,
were well recognized by Ricks (41) in 1969 and Friedman
(15) in 1970. Yet over 17 years later, Gau was still
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exhorting his colleagues to "...look to variations of
these pricing models (CAPM, APT and MPT) for real estate
rather than explore alternative theoretical approaches
based on any perceived inefficiency." (Gau {16) p.10).
This would indicate to the most casual observer that
there still exists some kind of institutionalized
reluctance to buy into MPT as an aid to real estate
portfolio management.
Nonetheless, one of the significant evolutionary
outgrowths of attempting to apply MPT to real estate per
se, was the formulation of a representative national
index. originally begun as an index to both serve as an
industry benchmark for commercial real estate
performance and an aid in the rating of portfolio
managers, its data base now serves as the industry's
closest surrogate for a real estate equity portfolio.
The index commenced tracking on the last day of 1977,
and originally consisted of 236 unlevered,
income-producing, and nonfarm properties valued at
$594.4 million. Today the portfolio has grown to over
1220 properties valued at over $ 15.9 billion. Its data
is still based on unlevered, income-producing, and
nonfarm properties that are held in tax-exempt
portfolios. The data is aggregated and reported
quarterly by members of the National Council of Real
Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) in two
components:
1) Net operating income, and
2) Quarterly change in market value (per appraisals).
The data is further segmented, mutually exclusive, as
follows:
Property Type Geographic Region
Office buildings East
Office/Showrooms/R & D Midwest
Warehouses South
Retail buildings West
While the FRC/NCREIF index does deduct portfolio
management fees, it does not reflect fees paid to real
estate advisory firms and consultants. Despite the many
restrictions of the index, the data base has
progressively grown under consistent restrictions. This
standard has been important, as real estate researchers
have been able to focus the practice of MPT theories
within the asset class of real estate equity, as well
between the asset classes previously discussed. The
concept of a standard index also helps to alleviate some
of the major concerns over the real estate market's
supposed inefficiency. Two of these sited by Jaffe and
Sirmans ({28} p.383) are poor data sources and a lack of
generality of market behavior. The FRC/NCREIF index is
the largest of its kind in real estate, and has shown
the ability to grow in relation to its content and
diversity. In addition there are several other real
estate indices8, only one of which, the EAFPI, is based
on all-equity, tax-exempt commingled real estate funds
(CREFs).
8 Ross, Firstenburg and Zisler {45) site two: the EAFPI
from Evaluation Associates and the Unlevered Equity REIT
Index (ULREIT) from Goldman Sachs & Company.
Brueggeman, Fisher and Stone (8) site three additional
ones from the National Association of REITS (NAREIT):
the Equity REIT Share Price Index (EREIT); the Mortgage
REIT Share Price Index; and the Hybrid REIT Index.
With these indices researchers began a long process
of reconciling the return and risk results from real
estate with those from comparable indices of stock
equities and bonds. This effort culminated with the
Zerbst and Cambon {54) work which summarized the
individual efforts of the past, while also attempting to
normalize those results across the institutional
investment spectrum. The issue of optimal mixed-asset
allocation in the context of MPT was the next logical
area for research.
However, incredible results were being generated
from this exercise, which showed that real estate should
be dominate any portfolio along the efficient frontier.
Brueggeman, Fisher and Stone (8} derived a portfolio for
the lowest coefficient of variation that consisted of 0%
stocks, 9% bonds, 10% T-bills, and 81% real estate
equity as represented by the FRC Index. Similarly, Webb
and Rubens (50) derived the optimal portfolio for a 0%
tax-bracket investor as 0% bonds, 0% common stocks
(NYSE), 6% common stocks (small), 11% farmland, and 83%
commercial real estate. Two years later, in 1988, Webb
and Rubens (51) again showed that by using standard risk
measures on restricted portfolios that include four
financial assets and two real estate assets (farmland
and residential) from 1967 to 1982 that real estate's
appropriate allocation to mixed-asset portfolios should
have been on the order of 79% to 90%! These types of
studies served to reinforce the feeling in the mixed
asset portfolio management community that:
1) They had probably missed a good opportunity by
not being invested in real estate from 1967 to
1982,
2) Something was wrong in the way returns and
risks for real estate were measured,
3) There must be significant differences in the fundamenta
of real estate that makes an apples-to-apples
comparison of it to other capital assets under MPT
meaningless.
4) Maybe there was further opportunity in real
estate, but since there is such differentiation
among real estate products, are certain products
better than others?
The last issue led researchers to look for answers
within the real estate asset class. With MPT providing
the conceptual and analytical comparative framework, and
the increasing capital budgets of large institutional
investors looking for diversified avenues of investment,
real estate researchers began to look inward to make a
contribution.
IMPORTANCE of DIVERSIFICATION
If asset allocation has been the major issue of
large investors, and modern portfolio theory the
mechanism that allows for the efficient construction of
one, then diversification in terms of quantifiable
analysis/rationale has become the solution to address
the issue. It has been pointed out that from a
strategic perspective, the goals that flow from an
ultimate investment objective are driven from the top,
downward to the asset classes. This type of strategic
thinking for real estate investment decisions has only
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recently come to the fore in the industry literature
(Furstenburg and Wurtzebach (141, and Gordon {18)).
Thus, diversification of the mixed-asset portfolio
implicitly requires the quantitative rationale of
diversifying within an asset class. The converse way of
describing this process is to say that each asset class
requires an efficient frontier of portfolios in order
for the aggregated mixed-asset portfolio to likewise be
efficient. This bottoms-up approach then allows for an
unbiased allocation of funds for investment into the
various asset classes in theory. However, in practice
the relative illiquidity, indivisibility, heterogeneity
and magnitude of real estate equity investment restricts
its advantages. Nonetheless, the issue of intra-
diversification has been the most significant
development in the application of MPT to real estate in
the last decade.
There are only a few examples of
intra-diversification research for real estate equity
prior to 1980. Miles and McCue (37) cite two relating
to apartment buildings, one with farmland, two with
residential real estate and farmland, one with REITs and
Ricks'{41} seminal article on various subclasses
financed by loans from life insurance companies. The
authors cite the increasing influence of pension funds
and their requirement under ERISA to utilize MPT to
responsibly diversify. At stake was the common practice
within the real estate community to naively diversify.
This practice held that by virtue of real estate's
distinct differences to other asset classes, elaborated
in Chapter 1, that diversification could be achieved
through the melding of properties across geographic
boundaries and property types. The geographic areas
would diversify the macroeconomic issues, while the
property type would do the same for microeconomic ones.
The Miles and McCue study was not only significant in
drawing from Markowitz' analysis to an increasingly
popular real estate subclass (commercial,
income-producing buildings), but also because it
analyzed the dimension of lease structure as a suitable
determinant for diversification analysis. The results
of the study showed that naive diversification did
indeed lower risk, and was a very good hedge against
expected inflation, though not against unexpected
inflation (confirming work also done by Brueggeman, Chen
and Thibodeau (7] published in the same issue). The
surprising result, however, was that systematic risk
accounted for only 10 - 15% of the total risk of a real
estate investment in commercial properties, orders of
magnitude below bonds and stock equities. This gave
further credence to the belief that the commercial real
estate market at least, and possibly all of real estate,
was relatively inefficient, and thus could offer a
higher risk index (the inverse of the coefficient of
variation) for the premium of information and/or
investment management expertise. Thus, broadly
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designed, naive diversification might not only be
non-beneficial, it could be counter- productive, as
well. Naive diversification within such an inefficient
market however, could provide significant opportunity
for higher returns at possibly lower risk. Only through
a Markowitz analysis under the MPT umbrella would one
know.
Hartzell, Hekman and Miles (22) sought more
exacting categories of the real estate sub-asset class
in pursuit of efficient portfolio goal. In so doing
they built upon the basic work of Miles and McCue (37),
likewise including lease maturity as a component of
leasing strategy, as well as property type, and
geographic dispersion as elements of diversification.
However, they went a step further by also modeling the
property size and the metropolitan statistical area
(SMSA), as components of diversification. Their
conclusions were very similar, if not the same to all of
those previously discovered by Miles and McCue (37).
Even the low level of systematic risk was confirmed,
once the data for the appreciation component was
geometrically smoothed (to account for appraisal bias).
This confirmation of intra-real estate diversification,
however, was significant for the additional determinant
components of diversification that were considered. Two
years later, Hartzell, Schulman and Wurtzebach (24)
marginally improved upon the geographic determinant by
analyzing the effects of dividing the United States into
eight, more economically related areas. Since the
geographic component under the concept of naive
diversification was provided as surrogate for
macroeconomic issues anyway, this later work was
continuing to search for refinement of the factors
important in comprehending MPT's validity to real
estate. Again, the results indicated that this was a
better modelling representation, as all eight regions
produced lower coefficients of correlation than the
previous four, arbitrarily assigned classifications.
Still troublesome to some researchers was the low
level of systematic risk that the Miles and McCue (37)
data had first shown, and later confirmed by Hartzell,
Hekman and Miles (22). For if systematic risk within
any component of a naively diversified portfolio is
large, then it only stands to further minimize the
unsystematic or specific risk by naively diversifying
across those components. However, if the systematic
risk is low, i.e. specific risk is high, then the cost
of diversifying across components might not be worth the
effort. This is because the real estate investment is
largely project specific and requires expertise within
the locale and an inordinate amount of managerial
intensity. Rather, if there is such a large specific
risk component, then there are bound to be opportunities
for exploiting the market inefficiencies within a
geographic area, property type, lease structure, etc.
Cole, Guilkey, Miles and Webb (9) tackled this issue
head on by first reviewing the Miles and McCue (37)
data, then establishing a ratio of total portfolio
variance to the average variance of the individual
properties in each diverse subcategory (geographic and
property type). This ratio then represented the
systematic risk to the total risk. The resulting low
ratios indicated that the risk in all subcategories
(East, West, South, North, Office, Industrial, and
Retail) was in fact largely ( > 80%) unsystematic or
specific. They thus set upon the development of ten,
independent (i.e. independent from the traditional
geographic versus property type categories)
subcategories of diversification. Some included only
geographic descriptions, others only property type
descriptions, and still others a combination of both.
All were developed from an intuitive sense for how
a real estate portfolio manager might think of property
classifications (i.e. Oil sensitive, Benefitting from
Trade Restrictions, Yuppieland, New South, etc.). Once
again, the Markowitz analysis was employed to derive
mean/variance/coefficients of correlation in order to
construct an efficient frontier of portfolios. The
results showed a composite of high, low, and negative
correlations across the board. The conclusion is as one
might predict from other works; namely, that it is
better to define one's own multiple, discriminating
subcategories for diversifying and abide by a
methodology, than to broadly and blindly diversify
naively and thus further risk inefficiency.
There is ample evidence that shows that over the
past 20 years, MPT has progressively been gaining in
stature among real estate academicians, as the composite
theory itself is adapted, manipulated and evolved. Just
how MPT has been utilized for real estate equity
decisions of the industry's newest and largest players,
however, remains to be analyzed in the following
chapters.
CHAPTER 4
MPT SIGNIFICANCE TO INSTITUTIONAL REAL ESTATE INVESTORS
Institutional real estate asset managers are
increasingly being forced to defend their
recommendations and/or positions for asset allocations
within the mixed asset portfolios, according to multiple
sources in attendance at the first annual PREA Institute
{33} on the management of real estate portfolios in
June, 1990. By most accounts benchmark portfolios serve
as surrogates of optimal portfolios, and as references,
lead portfolio managers into accepting certain
allocations as normative. As an example, consider
Pensions & Investments (41} approach to modeling the
performance of the universe of U.S. tax-exempt asset
managers. As reported in their annual survey (Ring {42)
p.1) effective 1 January 1990, the aggregated portfolio
and associated benchmark portfolio looked as follows in
Figure 3.
FIGURE 3
AGGREGATED PORTFOLIO vs. BENCHMARK PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION
for U.S. Tax-Exempt Money Managers
01 January 1990
AGGREGATED PORTFOLIO BENCHMARK PORTFOLIO
48% Common Stocks 48% S & P 500 Stock Index
29% Bonds 30% Shearson-Lehman-Hutton
12% Cash
6% Real Estate Equity
Government/Corporate
Bond Index
16% 90 day T-bill Return
6% FRC/NCREIF Property
Index
While the benchmark portfolio grew 21.2% over the
year, the aggregated portfolio only grew 15.5% over the
same period. The amount run by the top 100 grew 13.8%,
and the top 500 by 14.9%. For 1989 anyway, given that
the standard volatility of the overall market represents
a beta of 1.0, MPT explains how investing in the
representative market basket would have yielded better
performance than investing under whatever
diversification strategies were used. This has major
implications for the money managers whose added value
comes from their supposed professional knowledge,
insight, and abilities to capitalize on market
inefficiencies.
An analysis of the tax-exempt portfolio's
performance is typically made on the performance of an
asset class against its market's index. Thus, if a
plan's real estate return was 8%, while the FRC/NCREIF
index showed 5.8%, then more of the plan's funds might
logically be invested in real estate. However, when one
understands that the FRC/NCREIF index has steadily
declined throughout the 1980's, and that in the 4th
quarter of 1989 its returns were actually less than
ten-year treasuries for the first time in the index'
history (Institutional Real Estate Letter {3} p.3), the
portfolio acquisition manager needs to reevaluate such
decisions against the return/risk ratio of other assets.
It is incumbent upon the real estate portfolio managers
to be able to defend the maintenance, increase, or
decrease of their allocations in terms understood by the
other portfolio managers of competing assets. MPT
provides for this common language.
While the benchmark provides a test of performance,
it can also serve as a misguiding rationale for the
allocation of funds to the various asset classes. Real
estate equity perhaps suffers the most in this regard.
A 5% allocation in any one asset class is generally
considered to be the minimum necessary to carry any
positive effect for diversification (Hemmerick (26)
p.15). ERISA sought to minimize the incidence of
catastrophic loss partially through the limitation of
pension plans to invest no more than 10% of plan assets
in the employer's securities and real estate. A truly
efficient portfolio would consider investments
probabilistically in terms of the wealth portfolio on a
regional, national, or even global level. As has been
stated this would amount to a plurality of any U.S.
portfolio's real estate equity holding of between 40 and
50% (Miles (36). Most recently a commonly referred to
allocation of 10 to 15% has been recommended for such an
allocation. At the PREA Institute, most participants
agreed with the observation that a 10% allocation for
real estate equity was commonly used, purely by taking
the average of a subjectively minimal allocation of 5%
to a subjectively maximum (that anyone would believe) of
15%. The fact is that there is little in the literature
that supports these figures. Real estate equity
allocation has been "backed into" rather than
strategically derived. This is one area where the use
of MPT can ultimately aid in decisions of portfolio
acquisitions.
Such strategic decision making employing MPT will
thus require the same strategic disciplines to be
utilized tactically across the various asset classes.
Despite the encompassing study and effort by Zerbst and
Cambon {54}, one prominent researcher at the PREA
Institute observed that there has never been a study
conducted that truly treated stocks, bonds, and real
estate (equities, securities, or mortgages) in an
apples-to-apples fashion. There is nonetheless a
pervasive feeling that MPT is the framework that can
offer the promise of such comparison (Gau {16)). If
that is so, then real estate portfolio managers can ill
afford not to be versed in its usage, and conversely,
plan sponsors can not afford to have their real estate
portfolio managers operating in a structural vacuum.
Again, MPT is the tool for the construction of the
structure.
It has been pointed out in the previous chapter
that researchers in the real estate field throughout the
1970's concentrated their efforts largely on the issue
of real estate's contribution to the efficiency of a
large (institutional) mixed asset portfolio. It has
also been reviewed that their primary contribution
throughout the 1980's has been on the issue of
efficiency within the real estate portfolio,
particularly as such research has aided in the
development of strategies for diversification.
Throughout these two decades, MPT has provided the
researcher with the tool for structured analysis. Yet a
further issue arises, however, that calls into question
the transferability of the research from the halls of
academe to the corridors of investment managers within
financial capitols. Fortunately,
researchers have pulsed the trend of MPT usage at
selective points over the last twenty years.
The dawning of the 1970's brought forth the
argument of the efficiency of real estate as a capital
market (Friedman (15) and Fama (13)). The pros and cons
of this issue have been discussed in Chapter 2;
however, of particular interest of that era was
Pellatt's (39) proposal of real estate investments
utilizing a Monte Carlo simulation technique.
Advocating the use of this technique
structure of Markowitz portfolio theory, he
as of 1972:
within the
noted that
The most overwhelming conclusions ... after
reviewing both the literature and the practice of
real estate investment analysis are twofold:
1. Almost all methods of analysis rely upon
general industry 'rules of thumb' calculations ...
Almost no analytical methods employ present value
calculations.
2. Virtually no methods of analysis ... apply
sophisticated computational techniques or
statistical tests of validity.
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the several
Two years previously, Wiley (53) had conducted one of
the first comprehensive surveys of institutional
investment practices, which from his bibliography
Pellatt apparently did not refer. Rather Pellatt
referred to a less ambitious study by Ricks (41) in
1964. Nonetheless, Wiley's conclusions supported
Pellatt's statements, in that only 7% of Wiley's
respondents reported using an after-tax, net present
value (NPV) measure of analysis. Similarly, only 18%
reported using an after-tax measure of the internal rate
of return. The before-tax figure for NPV was still a
less than convincing 32%, and the IRR was not surveyed
in the before-tax regard.
A decade after the Wiley survey and the Pellatt
proposal, Webb (49} again surveyed the institutional
market (life insurance companies and pension funds) for
perceptible signs of increased sophistication in the
analysis of real estate acquisition. Citing the
increasingly dominant role of these institutions in the
real estate market due to their large amounts of
perpetual capital influx, Webb tested a similar thesis
akin to this one. Webb's implicit reasoning was that if
the largest institutional actors were not employing the
relatively sophisticated techniques of MPT for their
real estate portfolios (particularly their real estate
equity investments), then MPT was probably not being
used elsewhere, as smaller institutional investors were
significantly more restricted in their ability to enter
the market in any significant way. Because of the
latter issue, Wall Street had responded with a number of
investment vehicles, which could wring out some of the
real estate equity benefits in terms of real estate
mutual funds (CREFs), securities (REITs), mortgage
securities (FNMA, GNMA), limited partnerships (RELPs),
and regular mortgage pools. Edwards (11) detailed such
options for institutional investors and summarized the
pros and cons of each in a qualitative fashion.
Regardless, numerous studies have shown that no such
vehicle has replicated the performance in a Markowitz
sense of a direct equity investment in real estate, in
terms of its portfolio contribution.
In addition to the survey of the level of
sophistication in real estate analysis, Webb (49) also
provided a track as to this level by comparing four
previous studies on similar, though not identical,
surveys of institutional investors between 1972 and
1982-83. His analysis showed two significant results
relevant to this thesis. The first was that the
practice of MPT principles had clearly been on the rise
in terms of assessing returns. However, on the
complementary issue of risk, it did not appear that
institutional investors as a whole, or pension managers
in part, dealt with risk in terms of MPT, but rather
through indirect adjustments to returns. Given Webb's
treatment of the successive surveys up to and including
his own, these previous surveys will not be further
dealt with here.
The momentum gained from the application of MPT to
real estate research did not stop in the early 1980's.
The desire to make ex-ante decisions of investment
utilizing MPT principles in testing ex-post data, has
always enticed the research community; and one
unexpected opportunity presented itself to Hartzell and
Webb (25) involving the stock market crash in the U.S.
in 1987. Finding themselves in the midst of a survey of
institutional investors on their expectational factors
of real estate equity investors, the stock market lost
over 20% of its market capitalization in one day, as the
Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 508 points. The
authors were quick to spot the opportunity to gauge the
change in expectations of real estate investment given
this tremendous exogenous occurrence. Their results
have significant support to this thesis.
Among the 236 institutions surveyed by Hartzell and
Webb, 110 responded (46.6%). Of these 42 of 56 (75%)
were from real estate consultants and advisors, but only
19 of 100 were from pension fund sponsors. The reasons
that were given for the lack of pension responses were:
a) that as sponsors they didn't participate in
surveys,
b) didn't manage their real estate decisions
(consultants or advisors did), and/or
c) didn't have enough expertise to comment.
The third response was quite unexpected given the
increasing plurality of the funds in the marketplace.
However, the article indicates that 41 of 42 real estate
advisors and 18 of 19 pension sponsors actually answered
the questions, of which the major portion heavily
involved MPT principles of Markowitz (total returns,
volatility of those returns, and cross correlations with
other asset classes). This indicates that 60 out of 156
pension sponsors, consultants, and advisors (38.5%) are
at least using the rudiments of MPT, otherwise they
would not have been able to fill out the survey.
One last conclusion that is ascertainable from the
data is that pension sponsors are slightly more
conservative in their expectations than either their
institutional life insurance or consultant/advisor kin.
The sponsors' expectations of total return, appreciation
potential, and inflation were all below the other
institutional investors surveyed. Likewise, their
expectations of cross correlation coefficients with
other assets and inflation were more conservative than
any other group. Although the reason for this is not
directly apparent, it is nonetheless not surprising.
The closer a fiduciary is to the source of the
investment capital (i.e. their own), the more cautious
that fiduciary might be expected to be. Also, as more
recent market participants, pension funds might
logically proceed with greater caution.
Modern portfolio theory has been shown to have
found increasingly intensive use in real estate equity
investment in the three spanning decades between
Markowitz' initial theory and Webb's survey of its
usage. Hartzell and Webb have confirmed to a certain
degree that institutional investors in real estate
equity are also utilizing the techniques to assess
their expectations. The degree to which pension funds
have marginally committed to these techniques since
Webb's study is assessed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER 5
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF A SURVEY:
REAL ESTATE PORTFOLIO ACQUISITION CRITERIA
in the U.S. PENSION FUND INDUSTRY
THESIS OBJECTIVE AND HYPOTHESES
This chapter presents the results of a survey of
the U.S pension community's real estate decision making
criteria. If the level of sophistication with respect
to modern portfolio theory is rising, then a
corresponding change in the types and level of
sophistication would also be expected. Such an
undertaking requires a benchmark for comparison, and the
Webb {49} study of 1982-3 provides such a vehicle. This
thesis gauges the marginal level of technical
sophistication by the application of the principles and
techniques found in modern portfolio theory. Whereas
Webb concerned his study with real estate investments in
equity, mortgages, and construction loans, this thesis
considers only the real estate equity investment in
consideration of its uniqueness as a portfolio asset.
The survey responses shown herein were generated by
a questionnaire to 419 pension plan sponsors,
consultants, and advisory firms, who by nature of their
size and/or business could be expected to manage pension
portfolios that include real estate equity. By its very
nature then, the survey was biased toward the larger
entities in the pension fund population. This issue is
dealt with in the following section. The format of
the questionnaire and the cover letter that introduced
its purpose are shown in Appendix A, and the results of
the survey that follow, refer to the question numbering
of the survey.
The survey was designed to test a number of
hypotheses that together would either support, or fail
to support, the primary thesis. The questions sought
responses that were both factual and attitudinal, and
from the responses descriptive statistics were used to
infer generalized conclusions. The hypotheses tested
all flow from a generalized hypothesis that the changes
in the industry will have manifested themselves in more
sophisticated techniques than found in the Webb survey.
This general hypothesis is expressed specifically as:
1. Real estate portfolio managers have shifted
from a bottoms-up, deal-based, tactical mentality to a
strategic, top-down approach in allocating funds.
2. Real estate portfolio managers have become more
sophisticated in their diversification strategies.
3. Real estate portfolio managers have adopted
more sophisticated techniques for return measures.
4. Real estate portfolio managers have adopted
more sophisticated techniques for risk measures.
5. Real estate portfolio managers measure their
performance against both mixed asset and real estate
market indices.
6. Real estate holding periods have increased in
the face of several negative market conditions over the
last seven years.
7. Real estate portfolio managers have increased
their investment horizons by searching and investing in
a global real estate market.
METHODOLOGY AND INHERENT BIAS
From 18 - 20 June 1990, the Center for Real Estate
Development at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
hosted the first annual Institute for Real Estate
Portfolio Management, that was sponsored by the Pension
Real Estate Association (PREA). In preparation for that
instruction the survey found in Appendix A was prepared
so that students of the Institute might have an
appreciation for the state of portfolio management
within their field. In mid-Spring of 1990 survey
questionnaires were sent to portfolio managers at
pension plan sponsor organizations and real estate
advisory firms. Selection of the former was based on
Pensions & Investments' (5) survey of the 1,000 largest
pension plan sponsors whose data was reported as of 30
September 1989. Selection of the latter was based on an
earlier survey, also by Pensions & Investments (26), for
data as of 30 June 1989.
The 419 questionnaires were mailed to 318 plan
sponsors and 101 advisory firms. The 318 plan sponsors
were selected based on the magnitude of their mixed
asset poirtfolio. Those which had $1 billion or more of
tax-exempt assets under management, as reported by
Pensions & Investments (5), were selected for the
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survey. These 318 sponsors out of an estimated 39,375
total, control $1.584 trillion out of the estimated
$2.174 trillion in tax-exempt pension funds. This
equates to 0.8% of the sponsors controlling 72.9% of the
pension asset population. Of those defined contribution
funds that Pensions & Investments singled out with at
least $1 million in real estate equity, all were
included in this survey. Of those defined benefit funds
with at least $4 million in real estate equity, all lie
in the top 200 and therefore were surveyed. Since the
survey went to an addition 118 funds, it is not
unreasonable to expect that all sponsors with at least
$1 million in equity real estate were surveyed, thus
representing a significant segment of the population.
It is also assumed that given the barriers to investing
in real estate equity, $1 million is not an unrealistic
figure as an allocation to real estate equity. For
example, a $1 million real estate equity investment in
portfolios where 5% or 10% is allocated to real estate,
would indicate a mixed asset portfolio size between $20
and $10 million, respectively.
The distribution of questionnaires and responses is
shown in Table 1. The survey yielded an overall
response that was better both in nominal and percentage
terms than Webb's (49), and nominally somewhat better
than the focused survey of state pension sponsors of
Elebash and Christianson {12}. The latter survey
claimed an impressive 82% for the targeted audience.
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TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRES AND RESPONSES
TYPE SURVEYED RESPONDED % RESPONSE
Sponsors 318 83 26.1 %
Advisors 101 42 41.6 %
Total 419 125 29.9 %
Not all of the respondents held real estate equity
in their portfolios. This feedback was important,
because only those funds investing in real estate
(equity or mortgages) were asked to continue answering
the questionnaire. All others were asked to send their
responses back in self-addressed envelopes, so as not to
adversely impact the response rate. Table 2 summarizes
the distribution of responses that reported having real
estate in their portfolio, then breaks this distribution
further, by indicating the number of explicit responses
for amounts of equity and mortgages in the portfolios.
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES REPORTING REAL ESTATE
AND FURTHER SUBDIVIDED BY MANAGERS
REPORTING SPECIFIC AMOUNTS OF EQUITY & MORTGAGES
SPECIFIC RESPONSES FOR
TYPE RESPONSE WITH R.E. EQUITY MORTGAGES
Sponsors 83 61 56 29
Advisors 42 41 39 19
Total 125 102 95 48
70
A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 shows that there were 23
respondents who did not have any real estate in their
portfolios, or 18.4% of the total responses. 22 of
these were sponsors, while one was an advisor, which
didn't possess any tax-exempt real estate equity. It
was from the combination of these 102 respondents whose
subsequent data provided for the remainder of these
results. Nonetheless, the percentages that will be used
in describing the descriptive tests in the RESULTS
section, are based on the total sample size of 125.
Tables 3 & 4 provide the statistical composition of
the respondents. A significant caveat to bear in mind
when reviewing Table 3 is that many plan sponsors
utilize the expert services of the advisory firms to
manage their portfolios. Thus, the possibility that
there is double counting of fund assets is extremely
high.
TABLE 3
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF EQUITY AND MORTGAGE MEANS
(Dollar figures are in Millions)
EQUITY MORTGAGE
RESPONSES AVERAGE AVERAGE
TOTAL 125 $ 1,183 $ 888.3
THOSE
REPORTING 102 $ 1,449 $ 1,089
REAL ESTATE
TABLE 4
COMPOSITION OF REAL ESTATE PORTFOLIOS
(Dollar Figures are in Millions)
EQUITY | MORTGAGES
TYPE RESPONSES | RESPONSES
TOTAL I TOTAL
(MEAN) | {MEAN}
-------------------------------------------------
SPONSORS 56 $ 42,586 j 29 $ 56,107
($ 760) | ($1,935}
ADVISORS 39 $105,286 | 19 $ 54,930
{$2,700} | {$2,891}
TOTAL 95 $147,872 | 48 $111,036
($1,557) ( ($2,313)
While the sample is considered to be representative
of institutional real estate portfolio investors, it is
obviously biased toward large portfolios since that was
the targeted population. For example, sponsors reported
an average portfolio of real estate equity of $760
million, while Pensions & Investments (5) reports that
138 of the 200 funds with assets in real estate equity
have an average of $343 million. Similarly, sponsors
reported an average portfolio holding in "mortgages" of
$1.94 billion, whereas Pensions & Investments reports a
mean of $1.60 billion when pure mortgages along with
mortgage backed securities are lumped together, and only
$174 million if only mortgages are considered. Real
estate pension advisors' responses demonstrated the same
bias. Pensions & Investments {26) reported that a
sample of 92 such firms held $90.145 billion in real
estate equity for an average holding of $980 million.
Thirty nine respondents to this survey, however,reported
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total holdings of $105.286 billion or an average of $2.7
billion. Another result of interest is that both the
overall sample mean, and the sample mean for those
reporting real estate in their portfolio holdings,
indicate that the means are substantially above the
industry averages for both equity and mortgages.
Therefore, the sample appears to be biased to the
industry's largest portfolios, and thus conclusions from
the study may not logically be inferred to smaller
portfolios. To the extent that the objective is to
measure the rate of change in attitudes since the Webb
survey, this sample bias may lead to an overestimation
of that change. Conversely, one could expect that
increases in sophistication might take place first in
the larger portfolios. With a greater amount of assets,
the best in expert management can be hired, and/or the
more able a fund is to conduct its own research. The
competition to provide effective services in this regard
drives the level of sophistication for investment
analysis higher. Further, larger portfolios are able to
compete for educated human capital that can implement
sophisticated investment techniques.
RESULTS
Several of the survey results and their
significance to industry practioners were previously
presented by Louargand (32} at the MIT/PREA Institute
{33}. Some of the analysis in this section draws on
that paper, however, much of it is de novo.
Questions germane to any one hypothesis were
scattered through out the questionnaire. This is best
illustrated in the first hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 1:
Real estate portfolio managers have shifted from a
bottoms-up, deal-based, tactical mentality to a
strategic top-down approach in allocating funds.
Several questions that were delivered at the front-end
of the survey posed subliminal ideas as to strategy in
terms of returns, risks, diversification, and
forecasting. Questions 16 and 20 at the latter half of
the survey were designed as the key tests of the
hypothesis. It was hoped that after a respondent
reviewed the earlier, more technically oriented
questions, a more introspective and honest answer would
result for the two tests.
The second to the last question of the survey asked
whether a formal, written strategic plan was used for
real estate investing. 54% of the total respondents,
and 68% of those respondents who answered the question,
answered in the affirmative. (Subsequently, these
response percentages will be similarly referred to in
the manner of 54% (of the total) and [68%] (of those
responding). Further, when asked whether any optimal
portfolio model was used to allocate funds to real
estate, the affirmative response was 26% [34%].
However, when asked if such a model was used to allocate
funds across real estate asset types, only 13% [17%]
indicated so. Only two respondents went on to provide a
descriptive title of the model, while very few others
indicated that they used anything more than an unnamed
in-house model.
Certainly one of the basic, professional
initiatives in implementing a strategic methodology of
investing is to formulate what your objective(s) is in a
complex but descriptive market, what the immediate and
long term goals are, what strengths play in your favor,
and what barriers stand in your way. While the results
in this regard are encouraging, one would also expect a
higher usage of quantitative, decision-making aids, such
as an optimal portfolio model, to make what amounts to
very quantitative decisions, such as investing millions
of dollars for a stream of various cash flows. The
ratios of the results are particularly interesting. One
half to two thirds of the respondents utilize a written
strategic plan. Only half again use a model to aid in
the allocation of funds to real estate within a mixed
asset portfolio. Still only half again use a model to
optimize their intra-real estate holdings. This may
provide further proof that the level of sophistication
in analysis of real estate in the portfolio context lags
that of stock equity and bond analysis. A search of the
literature does not reveal any benchmark in which to
compare this test.
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As a subset of the strategic planning process, the
questionnaire also attempted to ascertain the
motivational goals for investing in real estate equity.
This is helpful in understanding not only the strategic
focus of the pension funds, but also the further
applicability of modern portfolio theory to real estate
portfolios. To construct this picture, Question 14
posed a selection of represented goals, and respondents
were asked to rank all seven of them. The results are
contained in Table 5, and indicate that real estate
investments are driven by yields, with the most frequent
number one choices being total expected return and cash
flow from operations.
TABLE 5
PERFORMANCE GOALS FOR THE REAL ESTATE EQUITY PORTFOLIO
(Listed in descending order by results)
Please rank your goals and/or preferences for your
equity real estate portfolio.
( 1 = most important ............ 7 = least important )
Ranking Cum.
Criterion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Rank
Total Expected 50 17 21 8 1 0 1 1
Return
Cash Flow 22 22 16 7 10 7 9 2
From Operations
Inflation 8 22 14 14 12 19 4 3
Hedging
Low/ Negative 18 11 11 7 5 9 30 6
Correlation with
Stock Returns
Potential for 5 9 15 19 21 10 12 6
High Appreciation
Residual Value 3 10 15 19 18 20 8 6
Risk Aversion 5 11 11 15 18 13 17 7
Other 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 8
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Much of the most recent literature has focused on
real estate ability to hedge against inflation. In
Chapter 3 it was clear that while researchers had found
this to be the case for anticipated inflation, real
estate was lackluster against unanticipated inflation.
Nonetheless, this survey showed that a primary goal of
the pension portfolio managers was this hedging ability.
While much of the literature has also focused on real
estate's impact on a mixed asset portfolio, respondents
were mixed on the importance of achieving low or
negative correlation with stock market returns. That
goal was ranked in the highest two categories by 29
respondents, but also by 39 respondents in the bottom
two categories. This may reflect the issue that the
respondents are from larger firms where the real estate
portfolio manager might not be as integrally involved in
the decisions of mixed asset allocation. The remaining
three characteristics show a fairly even distribution of
responses that show these goals to be important, but not
primary characteristics. Perhaps most representative of
this group is the fact that although pension funds are
recognized as the most risk averse group among
institutional investors, risk aversion is important, but
clearly takes a back seat to an overall expected return
from the investment itself. Of those responses listed
under OTHER, most sought diversification and
versatility of the investments as their top or
significant goal.
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HYPOTHESIS 2:
Real estate portfolio managers have become more
sophisticated in their diversification strategies.
Diversification techniques have been the subject of
considerable study since the publication of Webb's
survey in 1984, as discussed in Chapter 3. This
indicates the desire on the part of the institutional
real estate community to further understand the concept
of an optimal portfolio that is efficiently diversified.
The application of the concept has traditionally been
considered naive, as portfolio managers needed not to
have "run any numbers" to know that property investments
in different regions and by different uses of the
structures would by definition be diversified. As was
referred to in Chapter 3, Brueggeman, Chen and Thibodeau
(7) along with Miles and McCue {37), quantitatively
showed that there were high enough levels of
unsystematic risk both within a region and within
property types, that perhaps made a strategy of naive
diversification more costly than it needed to be. If
high levels of unsystematic risk could be found within
any given region, then they could certainly be found in
any other region or between regions. An issue that
emerged from my observation of this was whether there
were any additional criteria that should be or were
being used to more efficiently diversify the portfolio.
The issue had some basis for comparison in Webb's
{49} study, wherein respondents indicated that they in
fact diversified by geographic region (61.9%) and
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property type (61.1%), while 38.1% used some form of
limitation on the amounts allocated to the different
criteria of investment. While a whopping 38.8% claimed
to make no systematic attempt to diversify, the
sub-sample of just pension managers reported this figure
as only 5.9%. The latter was based on a small sample of
17, however.
Table 6 shows the survey's unrestricted choice from
a set of diversification criteria. A more diverse set
of geographic and property criteria were offered. The
results are listed in comparison with Webb's sub sample
of pension managers. Respondents could select any
number of the criteria that they felt they utilized.
TABLE 6
EXPLICIT DIVERSIFICATION CRITERIA IN EQUITY PORTFOLIOS
(Percentages are affirmative responses)
Do you use any of the following as explicit criteria for
diversification in your equity real estate portfolio?
Criterion Webb Survey Results
('82-83) ('90)
Property type 88.2% 85.3%
Property size NA 69.6%
Property age NA 16.7%
Tenant type or business 32.4%
Lease Terms NA 30.4%
Fixed allocation 47.1% 4.9%
Region 94.1% 69.6%
State NA 21.6%
Metropolitan area NA 37.3%
Metropolitan sub-market 24.5%
Economic location NA 39.2%
Other NA 12.7%
No systematic 5.9% 7.8%
diversification
criteria are used
There is a much larger group who diversify across
property type, and a smaller group who use the recent
concepts of metro and sub-metro differentiation, tenant
and lease diversification and economic location. While
there was little change among pension managers in the
total lack of diversification criteria, it must be
remembered that Webb's overall result showed 38.1% who
fell into this category. This is the most significant
change in terms of the sophistication in diversifying
portfolios, and is closely followed by the size of
those using economic location criteria, a relatively
recent concept in the literature, as well as financial
diversification techniques.
Once portfolio managers were conditioned to this
area of interest, they were later asked to rank their
top five diversification criteria. These rankings are
shown in Table 7 along with the raw frequency
distribution. The results indicate that respondents are
divided between economic location and region as the
appropriate way to achieve locational diversification.
Offered a similar set of choices for differentiating
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between properties, they stuck with property type.
Tenancy characteristics demonstrated strength as
secondary or lower criteria. There was also a fairly
large response for property size as a secondary
criteria, but this may reflect portfolio allocation
constraints as much as any concepts of performance
diversification.
TABLE 7
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION AND RANKING
OF DIVERSIFICATION CRITERIA FOR EQUITY PORTFOLIOS(Listed in descending order by results)
Please rank your top five criteria for diversification
in your real estate portfolio.( 1 = most important .............. 5 = leastimportant)
Ranking No Cum.
Criterion 1 2 3 4 5 Response Rank
-------------------------------------------------
Property type
Economic
location
Region
Metro area
Property size
Tenant type
State
Lease terms
Metro sub-
market
Property age
Other
None
(Don't use any
22 9 5 0
.3 17 21
.2 32 14
7 11 11
0 12 16
1 5 11
0 1 6
2 3 8
1 6 6
1 3 3
8 1 2
2 0 0
criteria for diversification.)
6 1
32
74
55
71
29
72
40
50
59
81
90
3
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
81
It appears that the concepts raised in the literature in
the past few years are being adopted at a fairly fast
rate. If so, increased attention to diversification
across financial and occupancy variables may be a trend
for the future that has already begun.
HYPOTHESES 3:
Real estate portfolio managers have adopted more
sophisticated techniques for return measures.
It was pointed out under the first hypothesis that
the primary goals of the pension funds are targeted at
returns. To assess this particular hypothesis, Webb's
survey {49} is once again invoked for its historical
comparisons. Webb compared both before tax, as well as
after tax measures and reasoned that the after tax
measures showed a clearer pattern of progressive
sophistication of techniques away from rules of thumb to
the more quantitative comparability of net present value
and internal rates of return. For the purposes of this
hypothesis, no tax distinctions were made, but the wider
variety of choices in Question 17e, were designed to
reflect Webb's after tax measures as well as some
additional derivatives of those measures. Though not
strictly comparable, the results in Table 8 demonstrate
a marginal improvement in the level of sophistication in
the intervening years since Webb's study. This is
particularly true, if it can be assumed that users of
partitioned IRR's, FMRR's, and Annualized Holding Period
Returns (HPR's) have at least the same level of
comprehension as that for the Internal Rate of Return
(IRR).
TABLE 8
TECHNIQUES FOR MEASURING REAL ESTATE RETURN
(Grouped in descending order of results)
What attributes do you use in monitoring your real
estate performance?
PERCENT RESPONSE
MEASURE WEBB Survey Results
Internal Rate 65% 61%
of Return (IRR)
Holding Period NA 10%
Return (HPR)
Risk Adjusted NA 5%
Return
Partitioned IRR NA 3%
Financial Managem't NA 1%
Rate of Return (FMRR)
Cash on Cash 63% 45%
Net Present Value 48% 11%
Payback Period 26% 1%
Discounted Payback NA 3%
Broker's Rate of 21% 2%
Return
If the previous assumption can be accepted, then
this sample shows that 80% use such measures of IRR,
versus 65% in the early 1980s. A parallel shift is seen
in the fact that only 45% of the sample uses cash on
cash compared to 63% in Webb's sample; and that only 2%
reported using a Brokers Rate of Return (After Tax Cash
Flow + Equity Buildup / Ini
sample reported 21%. A sim
the statistic for the Payb
indicate an increasing level
of real estate managers, an
estate performance in the
financial analysts look at
bonds, or capital budgeting
tial Equity) whereas Webb's
ilar decrease is evident in
ack Period. These changes
* of sophistication the part
id a tendency to treat real
same way that traditional
portfolios of securities and
projects.
HYPOTHESIS 4:
Real estate portfolio managers have adopted more
sophisticated techniques for risk measures.
In order to test this hypothesis, Webb's exact
question was replicated. An interesting aspect of his
study was the division of statistics reported separately
for pension managers and life insurance companies, as
well as compositely. Table 9 reports on the results of
this survey, and Table 10 consolidates these results
with Webb's results, both overall and for just the
pension managers.
There were two additional measures added in this
questionnaire that directly relate to modern portfolio
theory: Mean/Variance and Beta coefficients. Taken all
together, there are two striking changes in the results.
The first is the significantly consistent lack of any
specific adjustment for risk by one out of five
managers. There appears to be a component in the
population which treats return and risk intuitively.
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TABLE 9
RISK ADJUSTMENT TECHNIQUES IN EQUITY PORTFOLIOS
(Percentages of Affirmative Responses)
How do you adjust for riskiness in your analysis of
equity real estate investments?
(Respondents checked only those that applied.)
TECHNIQUE OFTEN SOMETIMES SELDOM NEVER
Adjust upwards the
return req'd
from the project
Adjust downward the
benefits expected
from the project
Use Sensitivity
analysis
Use Probability
distributions
Use Mean/Variance
analysis
Use Beta
coefficients
Other
No explicit risk
adjustment is made
43.1
16.7
48.0
4.9
6.9
2.9
12.7
14.7
8.8
13.7
2.9
2.0
2.9 5.9
10.8 10.8
0.0 5.9
6.9 21.6
11.8 28.4
3.9 38.2
8.8
22.5
TABLE 10
COMPARATIVE RESULTS OF RISK ADJUSTMENT TECHNIQUES
TECHNIQUE WEBB SURVEY RESULTS
TOTAL PENSIONS PENSIONS
Increase Return 71%
Decrease Benefits 40%
Sensitivity Analysis 21%
Probability Distr. 18%
Mean/Variance NA
Beta Coefficients NA
No risk adjustment 21%
No response
82.3%
52.9%
29.4%
5.9%
NA
NA
5.9%
55.8%
31.4%
56.8%
18.6%
9.8%
4.9%
22.5%
43.1%
85
Another perceptible change during the 1980's is the
acceptance of sensitivity analysis as a viable tool for
risk adjustment. Responses that this technique was used
OFTEN rose from about 13% in Webb's survey to 48% in
this one. It should also be pointed out that these
percentages are based on the sample of 102 respondents
with equity real estate. Many of those chose not to
answer any of these question at all. Certainly these
results indicate a much stronger reliance on
quantitative methods in adjusting for risk; and the
additional adjustments (i.e. choices for the
question) that were used in this survey also indicate
the beginning of some implementation of MPT practices.
The results are perhaps even more dramatic given the
large part of the sample that chose not to answer any of
the questions.
HYPOTHESIS 5:
Real estate portfolio managers measure their performance
against both mixed asset and real estate market
indices.
This hypothesis represents an expectation that
performance measurement is based on the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM), and thus is further evidence of
the application of modern portfolio theory to real
estate. In order to test this, two questions, numbers
13 and 17, were surveyed which would indicate the use
and reliance on significant investment indices.
A robust 83.5% of the respondents said they
monitored their real estate performance against a real
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estate index. This was followed by 49.5% who indicated
such monitoring was done against a formal, written
benchmark under their strategic plan, providing even
more credence to Hypothesis #1. 27.8% indicated that a
stock equities index was used, and 7.2% used a mixed
asset index like the B B & K to monitor performance.
With these results in mind it was particularly
surprising to discover the results of Question 13, which
asked whether respondents believed that the FRC/NCREIF
Index approximates the actual volatility of their real
estate portfolios. Only 30.5% said it did, while 17.9%
said they didn't use the index at all. This latter
figure is relatively consistent with the results in the
previous paragraph. However, a full 51.6% indicated an
explicitly negative response. If about 7 out of 8
managers monitor their results against a real estate
index (most of whom indicated it was the FRC/NCREIF
one), and the majority of the respondents have little
faith that such an index models their portfolios'
volatility, then the industry still has data problems to
sort out, if it uses a standard of performance which
doesn't match its needs. Nonetheless, the data clearly
shows that the important concept of a market index as a
tenant of modern portfolio theory, has gained widespread
use throughout the industry.
Two additional questions were asked that relate to
the hypotheses on diversification, risk, and this one on
performance evaluation. Questions 18 and 19 surveyed
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the attitudes of real estate portfolio managers on
relative risk and diversifying benefits of real estate
equity compared to the more widely recognized stock
indices. The results which are listed in Tables 11 and
12 indicate that the vast majority of portfolio managers
feel that their portfolios are low to negatively
correlated with stock market returns, and less risky
than a market index of stocks. This is consistent with
the finding of Elebash and Christiansen (12) that 79% of
state pension funds find real estate equity to be
attractive because it adds diversification benefits to a
mixed asset portfolio.
TABLE 11
RELATIVE CORRELATION OF REAL ESTATE TO A STOCK RETURNS
(Percentages of Affirmative Responses)
Negatively Correlated 30.9%
Not Correlated 40.2%
Mildly Correlated 32.0%
Highly Correlated 0.0%
TABLE 12
RELATIVE RISK OF REAL ESTATE EQUITY PORTFOLIO
TO A STOCK MARKET INDEX
(Percentages of Affirmative Responses)
Much Less Risky 24.0%
Somewhat Less Risky 55.2%
About As Risky 8.3%
Somewhat More Risky 11.5%
Much More Risky 1.0%
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HYPOTHESES 6:
Real estate holding periods have increased in the
face of several negative market factors over the last
seven years.
The financial markets in the United States in the
late 1980's witnessed a period of volatility seldom
experienced prior to that time. Since 1986 there has
been a significant change in the capital gains tax
regulations, two seismic collapses of the stock equities
market, a significant faltering of the bond market as
the result of proper regulatory intervention in high
yielding, low grade "junk" bond financing, and a
significant, multi-regional real estate bust that has
resulted in a financial debacle in the banking industry.
One of the benefits of real estate equity investments
that rewards investors for its relative illiquidity is
the inherent shelter from dramatic capital swings that
occur with sudden economic and financial dislocations.
While not all of these recent, negative market factors
have necessarily impacted all types of institutional
grade real estate, it has given pause to many real
estate portfolio managers to reassess some of their
underlying assumptions about the various types of assets
they hold.
One of these assumptions has been the ten year
holding period which every study up through Webb has
confirmed. Whereas Webb was concerned with the
possibilities of longer holding periods, and thus
increased the number of choices to reflect holding
periods out to 40 years, this questionnaire left the
answer open ended. Rationally it would have appeared
that holding periods would have marginally increased
in light of the extreme volatility in the capital
markets. Of the 88 who responded to Question 10, 53
chose a single figure, the distribution for which looked
as follows:
5 years ..... 3
7 years ..... 2
10 years ..... 46
15 years ..... 2
Of the 36 who reported a range for the holding
period, the distribution is catalogued in Table 12. It
shows the mean for the front end of the range as 6.5
years, with a median of 7 years and a mode of 5 years.
At the back end of the range, the mean is 11.4 years
with a mode and mode of 10 years. Graphically, this
conveys the idea that perhaps holding periods have begun
to decrease for indeterminate reasons. The range is
significant between 6.5 and 10 years.
TABLE 12
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDING PERIODS
FOR THOSE RESPONDENTS SPECIFYING A RANGE
FRONT END FAR END
YEARS RESPONSES YEARS RESPONSES
----------------------- I----------------------
1 1 | 5 1
3 2 | 7 2
5 13 | 10 21
7 11 | 15 10
10 8 20 1
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As was pointed by a few respondents, the holding
periods vary depending on the type of property held.
While this is certainly true enough, it is of particular
interest that 20 years was the maximum figure mentioned
and it was from only one respondent. Thus, from all
observations it appears that holding periods have
marginally begun to decline. One possible explanation
could be that this sample of larger investors, who
maintain "core" properties, often referred to as
"trophy" properties, has become more sophisticated in
tracking the cyclical nature of their core markets and
are responding to that cycle accordingly in the
interests of profits and increasing efficiency. There
is, however, no data from this survey to support this
contention.
HYPOTHESIS 7:
Real estate portfolio managers have increased their
investment horizons by searching and investing in a
global real estate market.
For this final hypothesis Webb again supplies the
baseline of data for comparison. Table 13 provides the
results of this survey, along with those of Webb's.
Again, his results are tabulated in an overall
institutional sense, as well as for the pension managers
separately.
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TABLE 13
INTERNATIONAL REAL ESTATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS
(Frequency of Explicit Responses)
COUNTRY WEBB SURVEY RESULTS
TOTAL PENSIONS PENSIONS
N.AMERICA
CANADA 14 1 9
MEXICO 2 0 1
PUERTO RICO 0 0 1
EUROPE
UNITED KINGDOM 2 0 5
FRANCE 2 0 1
BELGIUM 0 0 1
ITALY 0 0 1
SPAIN 0 0 1
OTHER 0 0 1
PACIFIC RIM
AUSTRALIA 4 0 2
JAPAN 0 0 1
HONG KONG 0 0 1
SINGAPORE 0 0 1
Considering the sample size, the results do show a
substantial increase in interest for international real
estate investment. This is particularly noteworthy
since the survey, as pointed out earlier, is biased
toward the largest portfolios. Of this population of
102, only 13 indicated they held property or mortgages
in other countries, while 86 explicitly stated that they
did not. However, of the 86 that did not invest in
property elsewhere, 18, or 21%, indicated that they were
actively considering that possibility.
Webb cited several reasons why investing
internationally was not attractive. These included the
issues of political risk, foreign exchange problems,
legal problems, lack of expertise, and tax consequences.
He also speculated that institutional investors also
felt that there were plenty of real estate equity
opportunities right here in the U.S., that they did not
do business internationally, or that rent controls were
stricter elsewhere, thereby limiting the opportunity for
increased cash flow (#2 investment criteria). An effort
was made in this questionnaire to test the correlation
between the decision to invest overseas and maintaining
a business office there.
There were 30 different respondents who indicated
they either held property overseas or were actively
considering doing so. Of those, 15, or 50%, indicated
they had a physical presence or formal ownership
affiliation in those countries. Many of the respondents
wrote personal notes on the return questionnaire that
indicated this was indeed significant in their decision.
It is also noted that many of the reasons formerly
cited by Webb, are similar to those heard for the lack
of significant investment in equities and bonds overseas
between a decade and two decades ago. This is another
indication of the general lag in adoption of new
techniques of analysis between real estate and other
investment communities.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
The rate of change in institutional portfolio
management attitudes about real estate is far from
instantaneous. Only in theoretical markets does
information arrive and become homgeneously absorbed
into the expectations process in real time. Real
markets take longer to adjust to new ways of forming
expectations. This survey illustrates that portfolio
managers have adopted new ways of looking at real
estate risk and performance during the 1980s. The rate
at which they have made these changes is perhaps slower
than might be expected, but the change demonstrates the
process of maturation and sophistication taking place in
the institutional real estate industry.
The eighty three pension sponsors and forty two
advisory management firms that responded to this survey
represent a cross section of the most capable
participants in the market for real estate equity
investment. The results show that portfolio managers
substantially implement their real estate investment
in a strategic sense, although the acquisition of
property within the real estate portfolio is still
determined largely by the attractiveness of the
individual deal structure. They are paying much more
attention, however, to the analysis of these deals in
terms of refinements in techniques of diversification.
Naive diversification of the real estate portfolio
solely by property type and geographic region are
yielding to other considerations such as tenant type,
property size and economic location.
Real estate portfolio managers have also noticeably
improved upon the level of refinement for assessing both
return and risk, separately and jointly. The use of the
basic and more complex variants of the internal rate of
return, along with Monte Carlo type simulations of
mean/variance and sensitivity analyses, are far more
quantitatively significant in this regard than the
subjective adjustments of returns to compensate for risk
that had prevalently been used in the past. When
considered jointly, the results show -that most
respondents are analyzing their real estate
portfolio's return and risk in terms of market indices,
which demonstrates a clear conceptual leap, if not a
practical one, to a major tenant of portfolio theory.
There are nonetheless some surprises in the results
that run counter to certain expectations as the industry
emerged from the 1980s. Despite the extremely short
term volatility of the national capital markets, wherein
longer holding periods for real estate were held to be
virtuous, respondents indicated a slight change in their
horizons from a longer, 10-plus year preference to one
more likely between 7 to 10 years. While portfolio
investors in fixed income securities and stock equity
have looked increasingly to the international markets
for further benefits of diversification, real estate
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portfolio managers have apparently not committed to
participate in such an arena to any significant degree.
The results show nonetheless that pension funds have
begun to ivestment in the global market over the last
eight years. This may lend further evidence to the
belief that the multi-faceted, domestic real estate
market is sufficiently inefficient, so as to allow
investors plenty of opportunities for reaping profits
without the competitive necessity of looking elsewhere.
It may just also demonstrate another factor of the ten
to twenty year lag condition within the real estate
community toward adopting more sophisticated techniques
of analysis in comparison with other capital markets on
Wall Street.
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APPENDIX A
MASSACII LUS ETTS INST1ITUTE OF TE()I:II"(INoIDGY;N
CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
Building W31-310Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Telephone: (617) 253-4373 Fax: (617) 258-6991
May 1, 1990
Dear Investment Professional:
We are conducting survey research into the current state of real estate portfolio
management. The Center for Real Estate Development in conjunction with the
Pension Real Estate Association (PREA) is undertaking an annual Real Estate
Institute to be staged here at MIT each June. This year's curriculum focuses on
real estate portfolio management. We ask that you participate by returning the
enclosed questionnaire to us by May 31, 1990. All responses will be used in
aggregate form only, and no organization or firm will be identified in any way. No
data will be reported in a form which would allow identification of its source. In
addition to its use in our curriculum, we expect that our survey results will be
reported in a journal widely circulated in the industry.
The questions are designed to replicate part of the survey done by James Webb in
1982 in which you may have participated. We hope to be able to identify the
evolution of portfolio management practice by comparing these results over time.
We have selected you as the person in your organization most likely to be able to
provide the answers to our questions. If you believe that someone else could
respond more fully, please pass the survey on to them and ask that they return it
to us. Feel free to call me at either of the numbers below if you have questions
about the survey. You may fax the completed survey to me at my fax number
shown below or return it in the enclosed envelope.
We would appreciate your firm or organization identification on our survey form
so that we can track our responses. We reiterate that no information will be used
in any way which could identify your organization in the presentation of our
results. We will return a summary of our results to you by the end of June if you
identify your organization.
Thank you very much for helping us to gain insight into current portfolio
management practices.
Sincerely,
Marc Louargand
617-253-3988
508-371-1169
508-371-1169 FAX
MIT CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTIONAL PORTFOLIO SURVEY
Organization Name:
1. Is your organization a: pension plan sponsor _ investment advisory firm _
other _ (please specify)
2. Do you hold real estate in your portfolio? yes _ no If not, please stop here and return the survey in
the envelope provided. Thank you very much for your participation.
3. What is the approximate value of your real estate portfolio? equity $_mortgages $
4. Do you use any of the following as explicit criteria for diversification in your equity real estate
portfolio?
a. property type _ b. property age _ c. property size _ d. region _
a. state _ f. metropolitan area _ g. metropolitan area sub-market
h. economic location i. tenant type or tenant business j. lease terms
k. fixed allocation by category 1. no systematic diversification criteria are used
m. other
5. Do you now hold property or mortgages on property in other countries?
property: yes_ no __ mortgages: yes _ no _
6. If you answered "no" above, are you actively considering acquisitions in other countries?
property: yes_ no mortgages: yes _ no _
7. If you answered "yes" to question 5, in what countries do you have investments?
property:
mortgages:
8. If you answered "yes" to question 5 or 6, does your organization maintain a physical presence or a formal
ownership affiliation in any other country? (e.g., branch office, sdbsidiary, joint venture partnership
entity, etc.) yes_ no If yes, in which countries?
9. How do you adjust for riskiness in your analysis of equity real estate investments? (check those that
apply)
Often Sometimes Seldom Never
a. Adjust upwards the return
required from the project
b. Adjust downwards the benefits
expected from the project
c. Use sensitivity analysis
d. Use probability distributions
e. Use Mean/Variance analysis
f. Use Beta coefficients
g. Other methods ( please specify)
h. No explicit risk adjustment is made
10. When evaluating equity real estate investment proposals, on what holding period ("time horizon") do you
usually base your analysis? years
11. Do you use formal forecasts of GNP growth, inflation, and other macroeconomic activity in your investment
decision-making process? (please check those that apply)
a. In-house economist's forecasts
b. D.R.I.
c. WEFA
d. Other service (please identify)
e. No formal forecasts are used
12. Do you use any real estate market forecasting services?
a. yes _ please identify b. no
13. Do you believe that the Frank Russell Company Index (FRC) approximates the actual volatility of your real
estate portfolio? a. yes _ b. no e. don't use the FRC Index over +
14. On a relative scale, please rank your goals and/or preference@ for your equity real estate portfolio. (rank
from 1 - most important to 7 - least important)
a. cash flow from operations
b. residual value at end of holding period
c. total expected return
d. inflation hedging
a. risk aversion
f. low or negative correlation with stock market returns
g. potential for high appreciation
h. other ( please specify)
15. Please rank your top five criteria for diversification in your real estate portfolio. (1 = most important
5 least important)
a. property type
b. region
c. state
d. metropolitan area
e. metropolitan area sub-market
f. economic location
g. age of property
h. size of property
i. tenant type or tenant business
J. lease terms ( maturity, etc.)
k. other (please specify)
1. don't use any criteria for diversification
16. Do you use any "optimal portfolio model" to help you:
a. Allocate funds to real estate yes no
b. Allocate funds across real estate asset types yes __ no
If so, does the model have a name or descriptive title?
17. How do you monitor your equity real estate portfolio's performance? (please check all that apply)
a. versus stock market indeg (S&P500, Wilshire 5,000 etc.)
b. versus real estate index (FRC, Liquidity Fund, etc.)
c. versus mixed asset index (BB&K, etc.)
d. versus strategic plan benchmarks (formal written targets)
e. versus performance attributes:
cash-on-cash return broker's rate of return _ payback _ discounted payback
Net Present Value Internal Rate of Return (IRR) partitioned IRR _
Financial Management Rate of Return (FMRR) _ risk-adjusted performance measure
annual holding period return (HPR) _
18. Do you think that your equity real estate portfolio returns are:
negatively correlated with stock market returns
not correlated with stock market returns
mildly correlated with stock market returns
highly correlated with stock market returns
19. Do you think that your equity real estate portfolio is:
much less risky than a market basket of stocks (an index portfolio)
somewhat less risky than a market basket of stocks
about as risky as a market basket of stocks
somewhat more risky than a market basket of stocks
much more risky than a market basket of stocks
20. Do you have a formal (written) strategic plan for real estate investing?
yes 
_ no
21. What is your primary source of strategic advice for real estate investing?
a. in-house staff
b. investment advisory firm _
c. consultants
d. other please specify)
please return to Marc Louargand/ MIT-CRED/ W31-310/ Cambridge, MA 02139
or fax both sides to 508-371-0521 Thank you for your response.
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